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The motivation for this thesis is to examine optimal monetary policy under alternative
scenarios. Different models are applied, which incorporates both theoretical and practical
methods. The thesis strives to address several questions in DSGE models: (1) Which
instrument should central banks select, interest rate pegging, or constant growth rate of
the money supply? (2) How should monetary and macroprudential policies be conducted
when policy makers fear that their model is misspecified? (3) What is the welfare gain
from a commitment when using unconventional monetary policy? Since financial frictions
are being increasingly included in models that analyse monetary issues, the roles of macro-
prudential policy and model uncertainty are highly relevant today.
The research mainly consists of three essays. The first essay evaluates Poole (1970)’s anal-
ysis within a modified Smets and Wouters (2003) model. Previous works only incorporate
limited features for central banks’ monetary policy choices and instead of; most models
are calibrated. I estimate a micro-founded model using Bayesian methods to assess the
relative desirability of using the interest rate or the money supply as the monetary policy
instrument. The result I find that monetary targeting fares better under fiscal shock when
intertemporal substitution is high. Monetary targeting is also favoured under technology
shock, preference shock, and labour supply shock.
The second essay analyses a DSGE model with financial frictions when when the macro-
prudential authority fears model misspecification. The robust control method is applied to
a macroprudential policy to overcome model uncertainty. Under commitment to optimal
macroprudential policy, I find that the robust central bank responds more aggressively
than it in rational expectations case. The aggressiveness is mainly because the central
bank fears that the impacts of shocks to economic variables are more persistent than they
appear to be.
The third essay quantifies the welfare gains when unconventional monetary policy operates
under commitment as opposed to under discretion. I find that the highest gain from com-
mitment is obtained when credit intervention is small. However, the high intensity of the
credit intervention policy generates the most stable consumption. The results imply that
i
the central bank has an incentive to discrete from a single interest rate policy instrument
to the other policy instrument that combines with interest rate and credit intervention.
This central bank’s discretion behaviour would be more evident under financial shocks.
The results presented in each of the chapters suggest that both monetary and macro-
prudential policies are important. However, their design and implementation should ac-
knowledge the limitations that arise from the policy instrument being used, the awareness
that models may be omitting important mechanisms and the fact that policy makers are
generally regarded as unable to commit.
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1.1 Motivation and Objectives
This thesis mainly studies optimal conventional and unconventional monetary policy in
different DSGE frameworks. There are three topics involved in the whole thesis. First, the
Great Recession highlighted some of the limitations of using the interest rate as the policy
instrument when faced with the effective lower bound (ELB). In this respect, the work
of Poole (170) helped shape monetary operating procedures across many central banks.
When faced with highly volatile velocity the work of Poole (1970) suggested moving to-
wards interest rate targeting, whereas when the reverse was true the targeting of monetary
aggregates was put forward as the preferable procedure. Even though most studies have
ignored the monetary terms in the model specifications, the others have also argued the
important role of monetary aggregates. The original Poole analysis was conducted using
an IS-LM model that lacked micro-foundations. It is natural then to ask whether and
how the conclusions of the original analysis carry over to a micro-founded model. Sec-
ond, the Great Recession (GR) led central banks to implement macroprudential policy
to buffer financial risks. However, given that the implementation of these instruments is
fairly recent, their full implications may not be fully understood. Consequently, it would
be analyse how a policy maker should behave when she fears that her model may be mis-
specified. I use robust control methods to model such fear of misspecification. Third, it
is generally accepted that policy makers are unable to commit to and that this results in
(discretionary) outcomes that are not first-best. However, the losses that arise from discre-
tionary policy have not been considered in models that embody financial frictions and the
final chapter sheds new light on this topic. To better understand the implementation of
monetary policy with financial frictions, the welfare analysis of unconventional monetary
policy with credit intervention allows us to examine the policy differences between com-
mitment and discretion. As policymaking in the future is affected by the forward-looking




The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 explores the appropriateness and
impacts of a central bank’s monetary policy instruments in a modified DSGE model.
Chapter 3 uses the robust control method to analyse the macroprudential policy in a richer
DSGE model within the housing market sector. Chapter 4 analyses the welfare gains from
commitment under the optimal unconventional monetary policy. The remainder of this
thesis provides an overview of each chapter of the essay in the thesis.
1.1.1 Chapter 2 Overview
The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate Poole’s analysis through a medium-
scale New Keynesian model. According to the arguments of McCallum (1988) and Nelson
(2003), monetary aggregates still play a fundamental role in the monetary policy. They
argued that the monetary base instrument generated zero inflation in 1954-85 in the US
and also dropped the volatility in nominal output. New Keynesian models that ignored
the money terms are found to be inappropriate. Hoffmann and Kempa (2009) also inves-
tigated the DSGE model with an open economy to re-study Pool’s analysis. They found
some crucial results relating to monetary aggregates. The interest rate instrument was
affected by lower bound issues, which make it challenging for policymakers to implement
the interest rate instrument. Therefore, it is of our interest to re-study the alternative
instruments in Poole’s analysis to check for the optimal instrument.
In this chapter, we examine the optimal choice by using a modified Smets and Wouters
(2003) model under nine structural shocks. Those nine shocks include three cost-push
shocks ( price mark-up shock, wage mark-up shock, and equity premium shock), three
demand shocks (preference shock, investment shock, and government spending shock),
preference shock, labour supply shock and monetary policy shock. The significant dif-
ference between ours and the Smets and Wouters (2003) model is that we apply a non-
separable money-in-utility function by incorporating money demand shock. In this setup,
the monetary term can affect the marginal cost, IS curve and then the Phillips curve.
The main contribution to the Collard and Dellas (2005)’s research is that this chapter
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evaluates Poole’s instrument ranking through the Smets and Wouters (2003) estimated
model. Collard and Dellas (2005) compared the policy instruments through a calibrated
model, whereas, we apply the welfare that is derived from the estimated model with full
structural shocks.
Our main result shows that the ranking varies under different shocks. Constant money
supply targeting fares better under technology shock, preference shock, and labour supply
shock independent of the degree of risk aversion. Interest rate targeting is favoured when
intertemporal substitution is low under fiscal shock and equity premium shock, and it
is selected when intertemporal substitution is high under price mark-up shock. Besides,
the performance of monetary targeting improves when risk aversion is high, and it is
ambiguous when risk aversion is low. The interest rate policy instrument is chosen under
wage mark-up shock regardless of the degree of intertemporal substitution. Although the
interest rate targeting is still a more popular instrument, the analysis in this paper has
found the importance of monetary aggregates under some disturbances.
1.1.2 Chapter 3 Overview
The macroprudential policy has been extensively studied by a large number of researchers
in recent years. Most studies applied the DSGE model with financial frictions; however,
few of them have considered whether the models are misspecified. Therefore, in this chap-
ter, we use the robust control method to the Kannan et al. (2012) (KRS) model, which is
a DSGE model that include macroprudential policy and the housing market booms.
Historical research on model uncertainty has mostly been carried out based on the
Brainard (1967) Bayesian technique. However, this method requires that central banks
know a prior probability distribution over models. The later minimax approach allows
central banks to minimise the maximised worst-case scenario. There are also some other
studies that investigate the robust control method, such as Hansen and Sargent (2001)and
Onatski and Stock (2002). These approaches are too complicated to calculate as it has to
4
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be written in the state-space form. Through Dennis et al. (2009)’s structural form, the
robust control method, the model is assumed to commit to the optimal monetary policy.
The reasons we choose the KRS model in for the primary model is because of the
following reasons. First, the KRS model includes both durables and non-durables, bor-
rowers and savers, different agents. These are fundamental for rational expectation models
with forward-looking behaviours. Second, the model applied the DSGE framework with
financial accelerator effects to capture macroprudential policies effects. Third, the KRS
model performs well in macroeconomic stability under reasonably different parameter val-
ues. Fourth, the KRS result also suggested that it is crucial to identify the source of house
price booms and financial conditions for the design of the monetary and macroprudential
policy. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to dig further to ascertain if model uncertainty
can affect the macroprudential policy model.
Our comparison under different scenarios yielded some exciting results. Under ratio-
nal expectations, when the macroprudential policy is implemented, the central bank reacts
less active than monetary policy alone as the new instrument could offset the financial
shock when it is implemented. In addition, under the approximating equilibrium, the
robust central bank applies the policy more aggressive than in the case of the rational
expectation as it fears the response to the shocks is more persistent than it appears. Un-
der the worst-case equilibrium, the central bank’s responses are more volatile than the
approximating equilibrium. Moreover, when the macroprudential policy is included in the
model, it always offsets the influences of financial shocks, regardless of the robust control
method.
Overall, when the robust control method is applied to the macroprudential policy,
the central bank fears that shocks’ impacts are more significant than it shows, therefore,
responds with a more aggressive macroprudential policy.
5
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1.1.3 Chapter 4 Overview
The unconventional monetary policy became a fundamental policy for central banks after
the financial crisis of 2007-08. Most economists studied the different formats of uncon-
ventional monetary policy models, such as DSGE models, financial accelerator models, or
DSGE models with some crucial characteristics from unconventional monetary policy. The
importance of commitment was also extensively accepted by the public. One channel of
transmission in unconventional monetary policy is called signalling channel, where central
banks communicate and inform the public about its policy on short-term interest rates
and other policies. This could affect public expectations about the economy. Therefore,
it is essential to understand the commitment problems in the unconventional monetary
policy model. In this third essay, we quantify the welfare gain from the commitment with
the unconventional monetary policy model under various shocks.
For the unconventional monetary policy, we study the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model
as this model is a pioneer study that explained the financial crisis and unconventional
monetary policy through financial accelerators to various shocks. For the commitment
analysis, we use the Dynare Ramsey method to calculate the first-order conditions to ob-
tain welfare. On the other hand, discretionary analysis is more complicated. We choose
the Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMAES) approach to calculate
the second-order approximations for the non-linear model. This method allows up to find
optimal parameters of output and inflation coefficients, and the welfare loss under discre-
tion as well. Similar to Dennis and Söderström (2006), we select two alternative measures
that are applied to the model to distinguish the differences: one is the percentage gain
welfare calculation, and the other is the consumption equivalence method.
There are some findings after the comparisons between different initial parameters and
model comparisons. First for the financial accelerator model with credit intervention, the
capital quality shock provides more substantial influences for the whole transmission mech-
anism than the impacts of other shocks. Second, the most affected variables are leverage
6
Chapter 1
ratio, net worth, investment, and asset price. Third, the intensity of the credit policy
feedback parameter affects investment through leverage ratio, premium, and net worth.
Fourth, the highest gain from commitment is obtained when credit intervention is small.
However, to have the most stable consumption equivalent requires a higher intensity of
credit intervention of around 50. The different levels of a diverted fraction of capital show
a decreasing pattern in the gain from commitment as the fraction increases from 0.15
to 0.38. The outcome indicates that the central banks would always have an incentive
to deviate from the single interest rate instrument to the policy with credit intervention,
especially during the financial crisis period, when deterioration of the balance sheet occurs
due to capital quality shock.
For the financial accelerator model, the capital quality shock is crucial in the economy
as it affects financial frictions, such as interest rate spread, leverage ratio, and net worth.
Under a discretionary regime, the shocks produce fewer effects on investment. The diverted
fraction of capital and survival rate for intermediaries show similar patterns in the gains
from commitment and consumption equivalent.
7
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A substantial number of researchers have attempted to unearth the optimal choice of mon-
etary policy instruments: interest rate pegging or constant growth rate money supply. The
issue was analysed early by Poole (1970) and recently updated with a calibrated model
by Collard and Dellas (2005) (henceforth CD). However, this issue has been neglected
in the past decade after the Taylor (1993) rule had become a more general policy rule
in literature research. As suggested by McCallum (1988) and Nelson (2003), monetary
aggregates are still crucial for monetary policy. Interest rate instruments are becoming
more problematic when it can provide limited impacts on economics after the financial
crisis. Therefore, it is fundamental to recapture Poole’s analysis to check for the optimal
instrument.
This paper will investigate Poole’s analysis through a medium-scale New Keynesian
model, as known as the Smets and Wouters (2003)(hereafter SW) model with non-separable
money-in-utility form, with nine structural shocks. The SW model was chosen for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, modified SW includes a set of structural shocks: three cost-push
shocks ( price mark-up shock, wage mark-up shock, and equity premium shock), three
“demand shocks” (preference shock, investment shock, and government spending shock),
preference shock, labour supply shock and monetary policy shock. Second, the SW model
uses the Bayesian framework, and it has been suggested that its estimation with structural
disturbances obtain a good fit to the data as well as the conventional Vector Auto Regres-
sions (VARs) method. Third, it has also been suggested that the SW model performs well
for monetary policy analysis through welfare loss comparisons, since it is capable of cap-
turing time-series data’s properties. (Onatski et al. (2004)) Therefore, the adjusted SW
model with more structural shocks could provide a well-performed analysis for alternative
monetary policy instruments.
I extend the SW model to include real money balances in the utility function. In this
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case, money demand shock would impose an effect on the marginal utility of consumption
and real wages. Then marginal cost, IS curve and the Phillips curve could also be affected.
This had been suggested by Ireland (2001) who estimated the simple monetary business
cycle model. Andrés et al. (2006) also examined the business cycle model for real balances
under non-separability and separability in the utility function. The result indicates that
real balances have impacts on output and inflation but plays a minor role in the model
itself. It is for our interest to propose a more general model with non-separable money
in a utility form to estimate the money demand shock since this may be an important
factor when assessing the relative desirability of using a monetary aggregate as the policy
instrument.
In contrast the Poole (1970) and Collard and Dellas (2005), I examine the relative per-
formance of the money supply and the nominal interest rate as policy instruments using a
model where the parameters are estimated. The comparison relies on the model-relevant
welfare function. I derive welfare function to obtain the comparisons between not only
from the volatility of output but also inflation, welfare and other variables. Under a tech-
nology shock, a constant money supply instrument is preferable as stability in output and
consumption as well as in higher welfare. A preference shock favours a monetary targeting
procedure as it stabilises output and generates higher output as well as consumption. In-
terest rate targeting fares better when intertemporal substitution is low under fiscal shock
and an equity premium shock. Interest rate targeting is also preferable under wage mark-
up shock independent of the degree of risk aversion, and when intertemporal substitution
is high under price mark-up shock. Under the investment shock, monetary targeting fares
better when risk aversion is high and is ambiguous when risk aversion is low. Therefore,
the ranking and intertemporal substitution differ under some shocks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows—the second part reviews related
literature. The third part presents the modified SW model. The fourth part demonstrates
the data and methodology with the estimated results. The fifth part examines the welfare
10
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analysis for alternative policy instruments. Finally, a conclusion will come at the end.
2.2 Literature Review
For the study of optimal monetary policy instrument between the interest rate policy in-
strument and the money supply instrument, it has mainly split into the theoretical and
empirical research. In terms of theoretical study, there is an abundance of related papers
during the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, Poole (1970) had studied one of the most notable
pieces in the literature for the optimal choice of the monetary policy instrument prob-
lem. Under their assumption, when the central bank targets the interest rate, the money
supply is adjusted to clear the deviations of the interest rate. When the money supply
is targeted, the growth rate of the money supply is constant, and then the interest rate
adjusts in order to clear the movement of monetary aggregates. Poole (1970) analysed the
stochastic model in a simple IS-LM framework and compared the output volatility, find-
ing that money demand shocks favour the interest rate targeting procedure and monetary
targeting is advocated when fiscal shocks dominate the economy. However, Poole’s simple
framework analysis has some limitations that were pointed out by later works.
Moore (1972) also gives an exposition to this instrument problem. Through the sur-
vey of earlier research on the values of lagged and behavioural parameters, the study
readdressed Poole’s simple IS-LM framework, including both dynamic and stochastic re-
lationships. Turnovsky (1975) studied and extended the instrument issue with a simple
linear dynamic model comprising of both disturbances and stochastic coefficients. The
result suggested that if there are only output and interest rate stochastic parameters in
the monetary sector, then the interest rate instrument is more appealing. Later in the
80s, more extensions on the instrument problem have been studied. Yoshikawa (1981)
considers the issue in a stochastic Keynesian model. He found that the factors affecting
the money supply instrument include elasticity of the money demand and the influences on
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the stability of the model. The paper points out that under uncertainty the main target of
the monetary policy is to accommodate shocks by modifying the growth rate of money and
making the variance of the interest rate independent of the elasticity of money demand.
Under this assumption, the policy instrument instability of money supply variance could
be possible, while its average should converge to some constant rate. From the other point
of view, Driscoll and Ford (1982) showed that the optimal choice should also depend on the
nature of the distribution of parameters and error terms, rather than model parameters
and the covariance among the error terms. His research demonstrated that even if there
is instability in the IS side, the money stock is not always the optimal policy instrument.
However, Daniel (1986) investigated a model with rational expectations and permanent
and temporary shocks to IS, LM and aggregate supply. The finding supports the money
supply instrument when the monetary policy rules allow temporary deviations from the
long-run money supply path to offset interest rate forecast errors. She also suggests that
the interest rate would not be an optimal instrument if the source of disturbances were
not clear. Moreover, Fair (1988) examined the optimal choice of the monetary policy
instruments by applying stochastic simulation in different economic models. His study
showed two aspects of results. On the one hand, the percentage differences between the
variance under the money supply policy and the interest rate policy support the interest
rate instrument. On the other hand, the model with rational expectation in the bond
market provides support to the money supply policy.
In terms of the empirical study, early papers have attempted to research the optimal
instrument issue with more empirical features or update it with an equilibrium model
by incorporating different shocks. Canzoneri et al. (1983) restudied Poole’s model by in-
cluding imperfect information and rational expectations. The results demonstrated that
households and monetary authorities could use incomplete current information to save the
wage setter’s indexing costs. Their findings confirmed Poole’s analysis, which states that
the real interest rate targeting is more desirable when the shocks of goods market are rel-
atively small. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) applied a cash-in-advance real business cycle
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model, finding that interest rate pegging dominates the constant money supply policy.
This is because the interest rate targeting provides a higher household’s expected lifetime
utility by allowing the household to react more effectively to fiscal shock and technology
shock.
Additionally, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) used the aggregate supply shocks to show
that the optimal choice depends on the slope of the IS curve. The volatility of output is
greater under interest rate targeting when the multiplier is more significant than one as the
demand curve becomes flatter. Friedman (1990) stressed that the appropriate definition
of the policy maker’s objective function is not merely the variance of output once inflation
is included in the model. The optimal choice of instrument depends on the decision of the
policy maker’s monetary policy targets.
Conversely, there were many studies which implemented the rankings of policy instru-
ments into the New Keynesian DSGE models but within different shocks. For instance,
Ireland (2000) evaluated the central bank’s actual policy from 1980 to 2000 in the DSGE
model, implying that the central bank’s real interest rate rule outperformed the constant
money growth supply rule under money demand shocks. Moreover, Singh and Subra-
manian (2009) applied velocity and fiscal shocks to the DSGE model to compare the
performance of monetary policy instruments with the Taylor rule. The results indicate
that the monetary aggregates are superior to the interest rate targeting under fiscal shock;
interest rate targeting is preferred under velocity shocks.
Recent related research concerning Poole’s analysis within the DSGE model is mainly
employed by which utilises supply, fiscal and money demand shocks. (Collard and Dellas
(2005)) Their findings state that the money targeting procedure creates better welfare
under money demand shocks regardless of the value of risk aversion. Further, the ranking
of alternative targeting is determined by the value of risk aversion for supply and fiscal
shocks. With respect to supply shocks, interest rate targeting is preferable when intertem-
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poral substitution is high, which is a converse circumstance under fiscal shocks. Finally,
the rankings are also different depending on some other factors, such as the degree of price
stickiness and capital adjustment costs.
For optimal instrument investigations, there is some empirical evidence to endorse the
monetary base instrument. First, the empirical study of a small macroeconomic model
of Korea suggests that the money stock is a preferred instrument with autoregressive ex-
pectations unless the price variable weighs on a considerable level.Ahn and Jung (1985)
This result stays valid even if the central bank’s policy horizon is extended to infinity.
Second, McCallum (1988) is also a supporter of the monetary base instrument. He be-
lieves that the monetary base growth rate could generate zero inflation in the 1954-85 US
period and also reduce the fluctuations in nominal GNP. According to McCallum (1993),
with a monetary base instrument and nominal income targets, the simulation results in
the Japanese economy during 1972 and 1992 also perform better than the interest rate as
the instrument variable. Hoffmann and Kempa (2009) evaluated a general two-country
DSGE model indicating different results between the large economy and the small open
economy. For the large economy model, a money supply instrument is preferred with the
real shocks, and an interest rate instrument is favoured with liquidity shock. For the small
open economy model, a money supply instrument performs better by applying the welfare
measure. Besides, a money supply instrument is more attractive when shocks originate in
foreign countries.
From previous reviews of the literature, we can sum up some fundamental points. First,
the optimal instrument issue is more attractive in the 70s until the 90s. Even though the
interest rate instrument has become the main rule in central banks, there were also some
supporters for the monetary base instrument. Most of the theoretical analysis, however,
my study concentrates on empirical estimation and evaluation. Second, later empirical
research has attempted VAR models or simple DSGE models to compare the variations of
output or other variables with alternative policy instruments. My paper would apply the
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SW(2003) model with full structural shocks as we all apply the euro data in the DSGE
models. It is helpful to compare the variations of estimation results between this work
and the original one.
The works in both Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007) have
provided a fundamental structural study for the new Keynesian DSGE researchers. The
SW model demonstrates a detailed economy that could generate the types of wedges we
see in the data from primary and interpretable shocks. The model has a lot of micro-
foundation features consisting of full structural shocks and parameters to react reasonably
to monetary policy shocks. Smets and Wouters (2007) estimated a DSGE model for the
US economy by applying a Bayesian technique. The estimated US model contains some
crucial frictions, such as sticky nominal price and wage, habit information in consump-
tion and investment adjustment costs. It also includes seven full structural shocks: total
factor productivity shocks, wage and price mark-up shocks, intertemporal margin shocks
(risk premium shocks and investment-specific technology shocks), exogenous spending and
monetary policy shocks. This indicates that the intertemporal margin shocks and exoge-
nous spending shocks can explain most short-run forecast variance in output.
There are some differences between this chapter and the models in Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007). To begin with, the utility function is different
from the SW model as I choose a non-separable utility function, including the real money
balances. The reason I chose this format is that in comparing the relative performance
of alternative monetary policy instruments, it is essential not to neglect the role of the
demand for money. Although Ireland (2001) suggested that real balances play a minimal
role in the monetary business cycle model, the importance of the real balances’ role can
not be ignored. Nelson (2003) examined the relationship between money and inflation
and between money and aggregate demand. For inflation impacts, he showed that the
monetary aggregates were closely linked to inflation in a few dimensions: First, inflation
is always a monetary phenomenon in terms of previous models. Second, the quantity
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theory has not given a justification for the existence of explicit terms involving money
in the model’s price-setting relations. Third, the long-run relationship between inflation
and money growth is fundamental for central banks. Furthermore, according to Andrés
et al. (2003), econometric estimates provide less empirical support that utility function
drops the money term. They find that the non-separable utility between consumption
and real balances vary with habit formation and the New Keynesian model modified with
adjustment costs for holding real balances. This implies that a forward-looking property of
real money balances, conveying on money a significant role as a monetary policy indicator.
Furthermore, this paper has a different sample period compared to the SW(2003,2007).
I have applied the quarterly data of the Euro area for the period between Q2 in 1984 and
Q3 in 2007. The data involves a different period than the Smets and Wouters (2003)
model, which used data over the period Q2 in 1980 to Q4 in 1999. The Smets and
Wouters (2007) study used US data from the period between 1966-1979 and 1984-2004.
My data was obtained from the Euro Area Business Cycle Network and described in Fagan
et al. (2001). When the euro was created, influenced by the Bundesbank who adopted a
two-pillar approach where the second pillar placed consisted of analysing monetary trends.
In other words, one could think of the ECB paying attention to, at least in theory, mone-
tary aggregates. Hence, using the euro area as the country in which to perform the Poole
analysis seems appropriate.
There were several reasons that I chose a different region from a different period. For
historical reasons, most countries started to establish their monetary targets in the mid-
dle of the 1970s. (Walsh (2017))The US, Germany and Switzerland announced monetary
targets in 1975, the UK in 1976 and France in 1977. Most financial market innovations
occurred in the 1980s have diminished the dependency on monetary targets, especially
after 1985. Poole’s analysis suggested that greater financial market instability that makes
money demand more difficult to predict would reduce the benefits of an instrument oper-
ating procedure-oriented toward monetary aggregates. Therefore, it would be interesting
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to check the data after 1984 and compare the result to the Smets and Wouters (2007)
and original Poole’s analysis. Second, as the consideration of the financial crisis, the data
ended in 2007. The main targets of monetary policy have changed to overcome the finan-
cial crisis’s adverse impacts. Hence, for policy consistency, the data applies from 1984 to
2007. Third, the data is selected in the Euro area rather than the US because the Fed
has targeted the funds rate after the 1980s. (Walsh (2017)) The rule described by Taylor
(1993) had been commonly applied by many central banks in the 1990s. The interest rate
instrument was implemented before the financial crisis that occurred in 2007; therefore,
it could be inconsistent with implementing the monetary aggregates as an instrument for
the US data after the 80s. Using the same starting period in 1984 and the extended period
from 2007 in the Euro area would be helpful for comparing the results from the Smets and
Wouters (2007)model.
Finally, this paper applied two different monetary policy instruments to obtain the opti-
mal choice between the interest rate and monetary aggregates.
2.3 Adjusted Smets Wouters (2003) model
The medium-scale model contains various features: external habit in consumption, sticky
prices and wages, capital utilization, capital accumulation, the fixed cost in production,
adjustment costs to investment and the indexation of prices and wages. Unlike the SW
model leaves the money term and money demand equation, I have modified the model by
allowing the real balances to enter the utility function.
2.3.1 Household Sector





















where Xt shows a non-separable utility form that contains both consumption and real
balances:






In the above equations, β is the discount factor, σc is the degree of relative risk aversion
or inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σL is the inverse elasticity of
labour supply, η gives the inverse elasticity of substitution between the consumption and
real money balances, εLt represents the labour supply shock, ζt shows the money demand
shock. The external habit,
Ht = hCt−1 (2.4)
where h is the proportion of past consumption in the external habit. When h = 0, the
expression is transformed into the conventional forward-looking consumption with merely
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When h is close to 1, the effects of external habit
on the real interest rate will vanish. I followed the external habit in the SW(2003) model
as the habit formation explains well in some dynamic macroeconomic facts, such as out-
put persistence, savings and growth, and consumption’s response to monetary shocksAbel
(1990). Apart from the preference shock, the utility function would be the same as in the
SW model when η = 0. The change in money demand shock and real balances impacts
on the marginal utility of consumption, and the total expected utility. A labour supply
shock would only affect the household’s total expected utility but not consumption and
real balances.
The SW model applies a separable utility function; the real money balances would not
enter any other structural equations. Therefore, the real money balances are ignored in
the rest of the model. However, here I allow a non-separable utility so that the changes
in the real quantity of money can influence the marginal utility of consumption. This
would lead to two impacts on the model. First, the real money balance would emerge in
18
Chapter 2
the household’s Euler condition. Second, to change real marginal cost with a measure of
the output gap, the real wage now contains not only the marginal rate of substitute on
between leisure and consumption but also the real money balances. Thereby the real wage
would affect the Phillips curve and the rest of the structural equations.
The individual household confronts the budget constraint that takes the form:
Mt + btBt = Mt−1 +Bt−1 + Pt(Wtlt + r
k
t ztKt−1
−Ψ(zt)Kt−1)− PtCt − PtIt − PtTt
(2.5)
The equation illustrates that household’s current financial wealth (Mt + btBt) is com-




nominal rate of return on bonds and Rt is the nominal interest rate), total income
(wtlt+r
k
t ztKt−1−Ψ(zt)Kt−1), consumption Ct, investment in capital (It) and a lump-sum
tax (Tt), r
k
t is the rental rate on past capital stock. The household’s income received when
they rent out capital services rely on both the level of capital installed last period and its
utilization rate zt. As in the SW(2003) and CEE(2001) model, Ψ(zt) is the utilization cost
function and is assumed Ψ(1) = 0 when utilization rate is one in steady state. Accord-
ing to CEE(2001), most of time the output is produced by labour and capital has been
ignored. The utilization rate of capital can differ once capital is involved, diminishing the
effects of output variations on marginal cost and inflation to a monetary policy shock.












1+σL} − λt[Mt + btBt −Mt−1 −Bt−1
−Pt(Wtlt + rkt ztKt−1 −Ψ(zt)Kt−1) + PtCt + PtIt + PtTt]
(2.6)
The first order conditions with respect to consumption, real balances, bond holdings and
19
Chapter 2
labour supply, which generates the following equations:














lt : Ult = −(λtWtPt)/βt (2.10)




















] = 1 (2.13)
Equation (2.13) shows the marginal utility of consumption. Maximising the utility function
(2.2) with respect to consumption, real balances, labour supply gives marginal utility of
consumption, real money balances and marginal disutility of labour supply:
Uct = (1− η)Xη−σct (Ct − hCt−1)−η (2.14)








Ult = −εLt l
σL
t (2.17)













Substituting marginal utility of money demand and marginal utility of consumption into
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η (Ct − hCt−1) (2.19)
It can be seen that real money balances are positively related to consumption with external
habit and negatively correlated to the nominal interest rate.
2.3.2 Wage setting and labour supply
Flexible prices and wages
In the model we use two types of wages: flexible and sticky. Concerning equations (2.6),












Under flexible wages, the household’s labour supply is positively related to consumption
and real balances. It can be seen from this equation that the real balances enter flexible
wages and then it would affect the marginal cost later.
Sticky prices and wages
As in the SW model, households are assumed to have monopoly power over wages. The



































λw,t + (1− ξ)(w̃t)
− 1
λw,t (2.26)
where ξw is the probability that households can not re-adjust their wage level, and 1− ξw
is thus the probability that households can optimize their wage. λw,t is the wage mark-up
shock that takes the form λw,t = λw + v
w
t . If households maximize the utility function
















where Uct+1 is the marginal utility of consumption and U
l
t+i is the marginal disutility
of labour. This equation illustrates that real wage would be mark-up over the ratio of
marginal disutility of labour and marginal utility of consumption, when wages are com-
pletely flexible (ie. when ξw = 0). Calvo (1983) and Erceg et al. (2000) The linearized
equation for the real wage is illustrated by equation (2.51). The equation demonstrates
that real wage is influenced through some components: expected future real wages, past
wages, expected and current inflation, and the difference between real wages and the
marginal rate of substitution between the labour supply and the consumption level.
What is more, households’ real wages also depend on the degree of wage indexation, γw.
When γw = 0, past inflation has no impact on real wages. When γw = 1, past inflation
exerts a strong effect on real wages. In addition, real wages are negatively affected by the
component term regarding the probability of the adjustment in wages. If ξw, the degree of
wage stickiness, is close to 0, real wages tend to become flexible and greater effects would
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be generated by the marginal disutility of labour and the marginal utility of consumption.
Investment and Capital
Households rent capital services to firms and choose capital accumulation given capital
adjustment cost. The capital accumulation equation is given by:




where δ is the depreciation rate and S(.) is the investment adjustment cost function.
In terms of the SW and CEE(2002), the function satisfies following conditions: S(1) =






When households maximize the objective function with capital accumulation with








, lt)− λt[Mt + btBt −Mt−1 −Bt−1
−Pt(Wtlt + rkt ztKt−1 −Ψ(zt)Kt−1) + PtCt + PtIt + PtTt





The first order conditions with respect to capital, investment and the degree of capital
utilisation cost yields the following equations:

































The equation (2.31) implies that the current value of capital stock (Qt) depends positively
on its expected future value (EtQt+1) considering the depreciation rate (δ). This equation
is also affected by the expected future return as composed by the expected rental rate and
expected capital utilization rate (Etrt+1zt+1). Moreover, the equation (2.33) describes
that the first-order condition of the utilization rate of capital equals the rental rate on
capital. The rental rate of capital rises up to one point where the marginal benefit equals
the marginal cost.
Price setting







jt − Φ (2.34)
where Φ is a fixed cost parameter and εat is the technology shock. The effective utilisation
of capital stock K̃jt represents the effective utilization of capital stock and K̃jt = ztKj,t−1,





λp,t Yt. Total cost is given by Wtlt + r
k
t ztKt−1. Minimising total cost
subject to equation (2.34) yields:
















Equation (2.35) implies that all firms face same capital labour ratio, and it is equal to the
aggregate ratio of factors. This implies that all firms also must hold the same marginal
cost as they hire according to the same capital labour ratio. According to equation (2.33)
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The equation (2.39) states that marginal cost is a function with wages and rental cost






Since wages are linked with consumption and real balances with a money demand shock,
then those in turn would also affect marginal cost. When a firm maximizes its profit,















)− (1 + λp,t+i)mct+i = 0 (2.42)
The price mark-up λp,t = λp+v
p
t , where the price mark-up shock v
p
t is an i.i.d. error term.
The indexation cost of prices is given by γp. As in the SW model and Calvo (1983), a
firm can only re-optimize prices with probability (1− ξp), and prices are perfectly flexible









λp,t + (1− ξp)(p̃jt)
−1
λp,t (2.43)
As described by Calvo (1983), firms could not change their prices unless they receive a
signal. With probability at ξp that firms are unable to re-optimize and adjust their price
according to past inflation. Firms can adjust their prices at probability 1 − ξp. Besides,
in terms of Christiano et al. (2001), there is an indexation costγp to the previous period’s
inflation rate for non-optimized prices. In those conditions, the linearized form of the
New Keynesian Phillips curve is derived by the equation (2.55). Inflation is determined
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by expected future inflation, past inflation, and weighted marginal cost function, which
is a combination of the rental rate on capital, the real wage, a technology shock, (ε̂at )
and a price mark-up shock, (ηpt ). When γp = 0, past inflation disappears, and equation
(2.44) becomes a traditional Philip Curve. When γp = 1, there is a perfect indexation
that relates current inflation to past inflation. In addition, when 1− ξp = 0, all prices are
perfectly flexible, and no price mark-up shock exists.
Alternative Monetary Policy Instruments
In this section we present evaluations of alternative monetary policy instruments. The








where m̂pt = ln(
MPt
M̄P
), MP t =
Mt
Pt







, which only enters the money demand equation.
In practice, there is only one monetary policy instrument used by the central bank. When
the central bank targets the nominal interest rate, the money supply adjusts in order to
clear the market. To solve the indeterminacy problems, and as in Gali et al. (2004), the
interest rate instrument follows the structure in the CD paper:
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ)kππ̂t (2.46)
where the interest rate is pinned down by the past interest rate and adjusted current
inflation, ρ = 0.999 and kπ = 1.001. According to Collard and Dellas (2005), this rule
allows a long-run response to inflation that is slightly greater than one to ensure that
indeterminacy would not appear in the rational-expectations equilibrium.
When the central bank targets money growth, the money supply is constant. Then
26
Chapter 2
Mt = (1 + µt)Mt−1, the linearized form is derived:
m̂pt − m̂pt−1 = µt − π̂t (2.47)
where µt = mt −mt−1=µ where µ is the steady state growth rate of money supply. The
equation demonstrates that real balances are determined by the constant growth rate of
money supply and inflation.
Market Equilibrium
The final goods market is in equilibrium if,
Yt = Ct +Gt + It + ψ(zt)Kt−1 (2.48)
output equals the demand for consumption, investment, government spending and capital
with utilisation cost. The linearized equation is provided by (2.57). The output is ex-
pressed by an aggregate demand equation which is a function of consumption, investment
and government spending. It is also a function of aggregate supply, including past capital
stock, the rental on capital, the labour supply and a technology shock. In the equation
(2.57), cy = 1 − δky − gy, denotes the steady-state consumption output ratio, ky is the
steady-state capital-output ratio, and gy is the steady-state government spending-output
ratio, finding Φ equals one plus the share of fixed costs in production.
2.3.3 The linearized Model
When nonseparable money is in utility function, where η = 0 and a preference shock εbt
is added into the expected utility, the model would be same as in the SW model. We
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L̂t = −ŵt + (1 + ψ)r̂kt + K̂t−1 (2.55)
Êt = β ˆEt+1 +
(1− βξe)(1− ξe)
ξe
(L̂t − Êt) (2.56)
Ŷt = (1− δky − gy)Ĉt + δky Ît + gyεgt
= φε̂at + φαK̂t−1 + φαψr̂
k
t + φ(1− α)L̂t
(2.57)
R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ){rπ ˆπt−1t + rY (Ŷt − Ŷ
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R̂t = ρR̂t−1 + (1− ρ)kππ̂t (2.61)












































In this section, we present the estimation results of the model described in section 3. The
first subsection describes the data and Bayesian estimation method; the second subsection
provides some calibrated parameters and prior specifications, and the third shows the
estimation results and comparisons with the SW model.
2.4.1 Data and methodology
This paper applied the quarterly data of the Euro area for the period between Q2 in 1984
and Q3 in 2007. The data was obtained from the Euro Area Business Cycle Network and
described in Fagan et al. (2001). There are nine shocks in total with seven observable vari-
ables: real output, real consumption, real investment, real wages, employment, inflation
(the GDP deflator) and the nominal interest rate. It is assumed that every single shock
is uncorrelated to overcome the identification issue caused by different structural shocks
and observable variables. Four of the nine shocks, namely the wage mark-up shock, price
mark-up shock, equity premium shock, and temporary interest rate shock, are standard
i.i.d white noise processes. The remaining five shocks follow a persistent AR(1) process.
All real variables are detrended by a linear trend, except that both the inflation and the
nominal interest rate are detrended by the inflation’s linear trend. The data construction
method follows Fagan et al. (2001).
The Bayesian technique is implemented as an estimation method, the same as in the
SW model. The Bayesian estimation technique is now commonly applied by many re-
searchers recently. There are some benefits to applying Bayesian techniques. First, the
prior has collected information either from microeconomics or macroeconomics studies,
which makes a close connection with previously calibrated parameters. Second, as sug-
gested in the Smets and Wouters (2003) model, “ the usage of prior distributions makes
the highly nonlinear optimization algorithm more stable”. This is especially crucial when
the size of the data sample is relatively small.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.99
α Share of capital in production parameter 0.3
δ quarterly depreciation rate 0.025
µ average growth rate of M3 over period 0.02
λw wage mark-up parameter 0.5
cy steady state consumption output ratio 0.53
ky steady state capital output ratio 8.54
gy steady state government spending output ratio 0.18
in our model, there were 500,000 draws executed by the Metropolis-Hastings sampling
algorithm; the posterior mean of estimation result was obtained. 24% of the draws were
removed, while there were 400,000 draws which were applied eventually. All priors were
settled to achieve the optimal mode, which provided the numerical optimization of the
posterior kernel.
Tabel (2.1) illustrates the calibrated parameters, which are similar to in the SW model
and the CD paper. The average growth rate of M1 is, approximately 2%, calculated from
Q2 in 1984 to Q3 in 2007 in the Euro area. Wage mark-up is assumed as 0.5, same as
in the SW model. The depreciation rate, 0.025, indicates an annual depreciation of 10
per cent. The steady-state government spending ratio is presumed as 0.18; the other two
steady-state parameters we calculated based on calibrated parameters.
2.4.2 Estimation results
This section will present estimation results and compare to the posteriors in the SW model
as well as the calibrated values used in the CD paper and other related papers. Table
(2.2) illustrates the mode and posterior mean for 28 estimated parameters. It provides
the prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters. The shocks’ variance is
inverted Gamma distributions and treated around 0.1 to 0.5 with a degree of freedom at
2. AR(1) persistent parameters follow Beta distributions and their means are assumed as
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Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters
Parameter description type mean standard error mode posterior mean
εat technology shock Inv. Gamma 0.1 2 0.3022 0.3098
εbt preference shock Inv. Gamma 0.1 2 0.1734 0.2574
εgt government spending shock Inv. Gamma 0.1 2 1.6720 1.7026
ηQt equity premium shock Inv. Gamma 0.5 2 6.1060 6.5839
εLt labour supply shock Inv. Gamma 0.4 2 2.0128 2.1500
εIt investment shock Inv. Gamma 0.4 2 0.3940 0.5180
εRt interest rate shock Inv. Gamma 0.1 2 0.0885 0.0909
εwt wage mark-up shock Inv. Gamma 0.4 2 0.1898 0.5800
εpt price mark shock Inv. Gamma 0.1 2 5.0000 4.7610
ρa AR(1) for technology shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.9065 0.9039
ρb AR(1) for preference shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.8118 0.7718
ρg AR(1) for government spending shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.9745 0.9656
ρl AR(1) for labour supply shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.9889 0.9805
ρI AR(1) for investment shock Beta 0.85 0.1 0.9121 0.9045
h external habit for consumption Beta 0.7 0.1 0.4219 0.4611
ξw Calvo wage Beta 0.75 0.1 0.3217 0.3391
φ investment adjustment cost Normal 4 0.15 5.9139 6.0835
ξp Calvo price Beta 0.75 0.1 0.8381 0.8324
ξI Calvo employment Beta 0.5 0.15 0.2882 0.2882
σc risk aversion Normal 1 0.375 1.4673 1.4806
σL labour utility Normal 2 0.75 3.1303 3.2276
γw wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.2599 0.2845
γp price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.1037 0.1178
ψ capital utility adjustment cost Normal 0.3 0.175 0.1320 0.3416
Φ production fixed cost Normal 1.45 0.25 2.0475 2.0454
ρ interest rate feedback Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9063 0.9069
rπ inflation feedback Normal 1.5 0.35 1.1711 1.3763
ry output gap feedback Normal 0.125 0.1 0.1521 0.1539
0.85, significantly distinguish from zero. Indexation of prices and wages are assumed at
0.5; the Calvo wage and price are set to be 0.75. Risk aversion is at the benchmark case
of 1, and the habit parameter is 0.7, which is the same as in the SW model. Figure (2.9)
to (2.12) in the Appendix depict the distribution of priors and posteriors.
The standard deviation of shocks is generally higher than the SW model, especially for
the equity premium shock and price mark-up shock. Within the CD paper, the standard
deviation of a technology shock, government spending shock and money demand shock
are close to zero. For persistent AR(1) parameters, preference shock posterior mean is
lower than the SW model (0.77:0.84), the higher in labour supply shock (0.98:0.88) and
government spending shock (0.96:0.94). While the persistence shocks in the CD paper are
generally more significant than the other two papers, as the parameters are between 0.95
to 0.97. Our estimated results are also similar as in Onatski et al. (2004)(OW, henceforth),
where there was a very high value in equity premium shock (6.5839:7). There were also
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highly persistent AR(1) parameters in government spending and labour supply, 0.9656
and 0.9805 in this paper against 0.972 and 0.974 in OW’s work.
Furthermore, there are some similarities and distinctions, among other parameters.
First, the posterior mean of habit persistence is 0.46, which is lower than the SW model
0.59 and slightly higher than OW’s result of 0.4. The common value of the relative risk
aversion parameter is suggested between 1 to 4. Therefore, this paper’s result is 1.48
against 1.39 in the SW model, while close to the benchmark case of 1.5 in the CD paper.
Given the habit and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameters, it can be
implied that a one per cent increase in ex-ante real interest rate would decrease approx-
imately 25% in consumption. The posterior of investment adjustment cost in the other
literature is advised between 0.12 to 0.28. Low value gives 0.13 in Onatski et al. (2004)
and high value gives 0.28 in Christiano et al. (2001). In contrast, 0.166 and 0.148 in the
SW model. The adjustment cost parameter suggests that investment would increase by
0.17 per cent if there is a 1 per cent increase in the current installed capital price.
Moreover, the mean of Calvo price re-optimisation is 0.84, lower than 0.91 in the SW
model, but higher than 0.42 in Onatski et al. (2004). Given the discount factor, β = 0.99,
then the weight on lagged inflation is 0.11, the expected future inflation is 0.88, and the
current marginal cost is 0.03 when treating other variables constant. The mean of Calvo
wages resetting is 0.34, and indexation parameter of wages is 0.28; compared to the value,
0.74 and 0.73, in the SW model. The Calvo wages parameter are also lower than 0.66
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Furthermore, the weighted value is 0.64 on current
inflation and 0.14 on past inflation. It can be derived that the average duration of price
contracts is one and a half years, whereas the average duration of the wage contract is
one quarter. This result is similar to the SW model where there was a higher stickiness in
prices than real wages, except that both durations are shorter in this paper. Compared
to the benchmark case in the CD paper, the probability of price resetting is 0.25, which
indicates the average price contracts period is one year. The value of Calvo price sticki-
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ness is shown in the Euro area, as the results found in Galı et al. (2001) that applied the
constant return to scale in the production function.
Finally, other values in fixed cost, capital utility adjustment cost, and the output gap
feedback parameter are all higher than in the SW model. Both lagged interest rate feed-
back parameters are highly persistent but slightly lower in this paper (0.90:0.95). The
inflation feedback is 1.38 against 1.68 in the SW model and 4 in the OW’s work. In
contrast, the output gap feedback parameter is higher than in the other the SW and OW
papers, (0.062 and 0.099 respectively), compared to 0.15 in this one. Overall, although
there were some differences with the SW model and OW model, the results are generally
similar.
2.5 Welfare analysis under alternative instruments
The models under alternative policy instruments can be obtained through the estimated
posteriors, except that the money demand shock is calibrated. The value is similar to
that of Andrés et al. (2006), ρm = 0.95, σεm = 0.0046. We can now derive the welfare loss
function and then evaluate the monetary policy instruments under different shocks.
Conventional literature compares the monetary policy rules based on the linear model
with simple quadratic loss functions and contrasts the volatility in output and inflation.
Later researchers have attempted to apply non-linear second-order perturbation methods
either in a simple ad hoc version or a utility-based welfare criterion of a welfare loss func-
tion. Such approaches allow the model to capture not only the variability in output and
inflation but also others such as investment, wage inflation and employment. My research
follows Levine et al. (2008) paper’s welfare loss analysis, which is based on the Smets and
Wouters (2003) model. The loss function is approximately given by, 1
1see the detailed derivations in the Appendix
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Table 2.3: Standard Deviations and Welfare(σc = 1.5)
shocks RTy MTy RTc MTc RTπ MTπ RTr MTr RTw MTw
technology shock 0.62 0.53 0.23 0.21 0.13 0.17 - 0.05 0.52 0.58
preference shock 0.23 0.36 0.36 0.10 0.05 0.03 - 0.29 0.47 0.16
government spending shock 0.62 0.67 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.09 - 0.03 0.33 0.39
equity premium shock 0.33 0.35 0.08 0.07 0.018 0.022 - 0.007 0.15 0.17
labour supply shock 2.77 2.70 2.41 2.33 0.23 0.34 - 0.12 1.27 1.54
investment shock 0.28 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.04 - 0.01 0.14 0.18
wage mark-up shock 0.0067 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.0026 0.0028 - 0.0005 0.0507 0.0516
price mark-up shock 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.149 0.151 - 0.014 0.26 0.22
shocks RTrk MTrk RTmc MTmc RTl MTl RTi MTi RTwel MTwel
technology shock 0.38 0.35 0.79 0.89 0.40 0.12 2.28 1.97 -4.2830 -3.7317
preference shock 0.13 0.20 0.36 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.7 1.9 -0.7299 -0.3863
government spending shock 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.278 0.285 1.30 1.27 -1.69 -1.81
equity premium shock 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 1.67 1.72 -0.2768 -0.2989
labour supply shock 0.79 0.71 0.86 1.09 1.07 1.06 6.26 6.22 -44.7978 -44.7807
investment shock 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.12 1.53 1.68 -6.1764 -6.2115
wage mark-up shock 0.0095 0.0097 0.03827 0.03898 0.01143 0.01106 0.0197 0.0157 -0.0209 -0.0210
price mark-up shock 0.09 0.07 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.46 0.37 -0.9694 -0.9074
RTy=output in the interest rate targeting; MTy=output in the money supply targeting; the same applies
for others; RTwel=welfare in interest rate targeting; MTwel= welfare in money supply targeting.
Ut = wc(ct − hct−1)2 + wll2 + wπ(πt − γpπt−1)2 + w∆w(∆wt − γw∆wt−1)2




2 + wz(zt + ψat)





























wlk = (1− βh)(1− h)−σα(1− α); (2.76)
wz = (1− βh)(1− h)−σα/φ; (2.77)
wi = (1− βh)(1− h)−σδky(1/ψ); (2.78)
Table (2.3) illustrates the standard deviations of nine variables under alternative in-
struments when one shock dominates, and the others are treated as fixed. The interest
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Table 2.4: Lower Volatility and Higher Welfare (σc = 1.5)
shocks y c π w rk mc l i welfare
technology shock MT MT RT RT MT RT MT MT MT
preference shock RT MT MT MT RT MT RT RT MT
government spending shock RT MT RT RT MT RT RT MT RT
equity premium shock RT MT RT RT RT RT RT RT RT
labour supply shock MT MT RT RT MT RT MT MT MT
investment shock RT MT RT RT RT RT RT RT RT
wage mark-up shock MT MT RT RT RT RT MT MT RT
price mark-up shock MT MT RT MT MT MT MT MT MT
MT=money supply targeting; RT= interest rate targeting.
rate shock is eliminated in the monetary policy analysis as the nominal interest rate is
exogenous in the interest rate targeting. Table (2.4) summaries the performance of the
alternative monetary policy instrument with lower standard deviations and higher welfare.
Like in the CD paper suggested, the rankings based on output stability and welfare do
not coincide. However, both the CD and Poole’s analysis have ignored the importance of
inflation role. Therefore, the rankings in this paper will depend not only the volatility of
output and inflation but also welfare. According to tables (2.3) and (2.4) , there are some
interesting points worth noting:
(1) for both instruments, the labour supply shock generates the most volatility, while wage
mark-up shock produces the most stability;
(2) for welfare, results are ambiguous under different disturbances;
(3) the money supply instrument is preferable in consumption stabilisation target regard-
less of any shock;
(4) interest rate pegging generates lower variability in all variables except consumption
under both equity premium shock and investment shock;
(5) a money supply instrument delivers lower volatility for all variables except inflation
under price mark-up shock.
In order to understand the results, it is necessary to analyse the alternative policy
instruments under specific shock. Given the benchmark case (σc = 1.5), impulse response
graphs are carried out. The figures below depict the impulse response exercises under nine
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Table 2.5: Standard Deviations and Welfare (σc = 0.5)
shocks RTy MTy RTc MTc RTπ MTπ RTr MTr RTwel MTwel
technology shock 1.0737 0.7658 0.9212 0.7585 0.1014 0.1249 - 0.0355 -5.7969 -3.9563
preference shock 1.4633 0.2692 2.5206 0.6010 0.1057 0.0159 - 0.2962 -38.1536 -2.3075
government spending shock 1.2102 0.5594 2.0026 0.6413 0.0292 0.0557 - 0.0186 -24.0295 -2.6217
equity premium shock 0.3161 0.3383 0.1793 0.1568 0.0158 0.0199 - 0.0063 -0.2535 -0.2219
labour supply shock 3.4597 3.4079 4.0932 4.0199 0.1543 0.2349 - 0.0802 -104.4277 -101.3384
investment shock 0.2616 0.2990 0.3168 0.2874 0.0229 0.0338 - 0.0121 -0.6315 -0.5538
wage mark-up shock 0.0098 0.9640 0.011 0.7924 0.0024 0.1367 - 0.0386 -0.0097 -4.5317
price mark-up shock 0.2924 1.0767 0.3682 0.9055 0.1466 0.2030 - 0.0402 -1.1961 -6.1593
Table 2.6: Standard Deviations and Welfare (σc = 3.5)
shocks RTy MTy RTc MTc RTπ MTπ RTr MTr RTwel MTwel
technology shock 0.7831 0.5343 0.2012 0.2055 0.1387 0.1671 - 0.0512 -14.5464 -12.7364
preference shock 0.2611 0.3627 0.3982 0.1040 0.0531 0.0294 - 0.2929 -8.1358 -5.3291
government spending shock 0.1743 0.6749 0.2891 0.1957 0.0114 0.0876 - 0.0311 -3.9590 -15.1597
equity premium shock 0.3412 0.3557 0.0403 0.0364 0.0188 0.0226 - 0.0075 -3.3976 -3.6910
labour supply shock 2.2961 2.2368 1.3002 1.2427 0.2693 0.4019 - 0.1461 -219.5192 -216.4778
investment shock 0.2884 0.3277 0.0659 0.0604 0.0301 0.0419 - 0.0153 -2.6188 -3.3760
wage mark-up shock 0.0055 0.6846 0.002 0.1690 0.0026 0.1840 - 0.055 -0.0025 -18.0662
price mark-up shock 0.1343 0.7529 0.0606 0.1877 0.1501 0.2420 - 0.0552 -3.0532 -23.7152
structural shocks: the black solid line, RT, represents the interest rate targeting; the red
dash line, MT, represents the money growth targeting.
Technology shock
Figure (2.1) illustrates the impacts of a positive technology shock. It can be seen that the
movements generally share the same pattern in both monetary policy instruments, except
that the interest rate is constant under RT. The improvement in technology increases out-
put, consumption, and investment. However, higher productivity increases efficiency; this
reduces the marginal cost and rental capital cost. It also declines employment and rises
wages gradually. Under the constant growth rate of money supply instrument, the real
interest rate declines. This leads to lower inflation, which reverts to its steady-state over
time. Under interest rate targeting, the overall movements are slightly lower. The central
bank increases the money supply when technology improves, then inflation decreases ini-
tially and then grows over time. This result is also similar to Ireland (2000).
A money supply instrument brings about stability in output, consumption, rental rate
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Function to a Techonology Shock
RT denotes the interest rate targeting; MT denotes the money supply targeting.
Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Function to a Preference Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
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on capital, employment and investment. However, even interest rate pegging stabilise
inflation and real wages, MT is better selected as it also generates higher welfare. Table
(2.5) and (2.6) provide volatilities and welfare results under different degree of intertem-
poral substitution. It can be seen that higher intertemporal substitution (σc = 0.5) does
not affect the volatility and welfare in terms of output and the inflation target. Therefore,
the overall effects show that MT fares better under technology shock. This distinguishes
from CD’s result that RT fares better when intertemporal substitution is low, and MT is
chosen when intertemporal substitution is high.
Preference shock
Figure (2.2) depicts the preference shock under two policy instruments. With interest
rate pegging, preference shock raises the marginal utility of consumption and increases
the output, employment. The central bank needs to reduce the money supply to prevent
the raising of the interest rate. The accelerated output and consumption lead to a sub-
stantial crowding-out effect on investment. With a fixed interest rate, higher consumption
leads to higher expected inflation; ultimately, a minor growth is delivered into inflation.
On the other hand, money growth targeting generates different patterns of movements.
Consumption still increases but in a much smaller magnitude. When monetary policy
responds the interest rate declines, leading to lower output, in addition to real wages, and
a larger decrease in investment.
The tables (2.3) to (2.5) show that monetary aggregates lead to higher volatility in
output, the rental rate on capital, employment and investment, whereas the stability in
output comes with a cost in the volatility of consumption, inflation and real wages. Higher
welfare in monetary aggregates indicates that MT fares better. When intertemporal sub-
stitution is high (σc = 0.5), welfare is not changed, but the output is more stable in MT.




Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Function to a Government Spending
Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Function to a Labour Supply Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Function to a Investment Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Function to an Equity Premium Shock




As in the government spending shock shown in Figure (2.3) both instruments have simi-
lar patterns, but the monetary growth target has a slightly more substantial effect. With
positive fiscal shock under the interest rate targeting, the higher output poses a significant
crowding-out impact on consumption and investment. The central bank has to increase
the money supply to prevent the interest rate from rising. Thus, creating higher inflation,
the higher rental rate of capital, marginal cost, and real wages. In the other instrument,
the money supply is constant, causing interest rates to rise. This also implies lower con-
sumption and investment.
Moreover, Table (2.4) demonstrates that interest rate targeting generates higher sta-
bility in output, inflation, real wage, marginal cost and employment. However, higher
stability in output leads to more fluctuations in consumption and investment due to the
government spending crowding out effect. With higher welfare in interest rate targeting,
RT fares better under the benchmark case. When intertemporal substitution is high, MT
stabilise output and creates higher welfare; thus, MT fares better. This result is opposite
to CD’s result that MT is better off when intertemporal substitution is low.
Labour supply shock
For the labour supply shock in RT (Figure 2.4) output, employment, and consumption
grows. Adversely, the real wage is reduced significantly but temporarily. This leads to a
decline in marginal cost and inflation. MT shows a smaller response than RT. Given the
fixed growth rate of money supply, the central bank reacts to the growth in labour supply
by decreasing the interest rate, which poses the impacts in increasing consumption and
investment.
According to the previous impulse responses and volatilities, the interest rate instru-
ment produces higher stability in inflation, real wages and marginal cost, but more volatil-
ity in output, consumption and investment. Monetary targeting also generates higher
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welfare. Hence, the net effect is that the MT fares better. When risk aversion is low
(σc = 0.5), the result does not change, which leads us to conclude that monetary targeting
is better under labour supply shock.
Investment shock and Equity premium shock
An acceleration in investment increase output (Figure (2.5)) real wages and employment
in both RT and MT. There exists significant crowding-out effect on consumption, while
no substantial impact on inflation and interest rate were observed as they are close to the
zero steady-state. Under the investment shock, the interest rate instrument is preferable
for all variables excluding consumption. In terms of higher welfare in RT, the net effect
shows that interest rate targeting fares better when risk aversion is high (σc = 1.5). The
higher intertemporal substitution (σc = 0.5) alters the welfare result, leading to higher
welfare in MT. While the RT still generates more stability in output and inflation, the
result is ambiguous under a high degree of intertemporal substitution.
Figure (2.6) demonstrates the effects of equity premium shock. As this shock is not
directly influenced by the structure of the economy, it can be seen that the overall effects
to variables are limited and quite small. There is a rise of output, real wages, employment,
marginal cost and investment, whereas there is a minor crowding out effect on consumption
and nearly no influences on inflation and the interest rate. Table (2.4) shows that interest
rate pegging generates higher stability in all variables, excluding that of consumption.
Given higher welfare in RT, it is clear to show that RT fares better. When intertemporal
substitution becomes higher, the output is more variable under RT. Since welfare is higher
in MT, it is better off when intertemporal substitution is high.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Function to a Price Mark-up Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.8: Impulse Response Function to a Wage Mark-up Shock
RT and MT see notes in Figure 2.1
44
Chapter 2
Price and wage mark-up shock
Figure (2.7) plots the price mark-up shock, which leads to a higher inflation, and, con-
tributes to a decline in output, consumption, real wages, and investment. To stabilize
the price level, the central bank has to increase the interest rate under MT and reduce
the money supply in RT, despite the impacts on interest rate and employment which are
particularly small. Statically analysing a constant money supply instrument stabilizes all
variables but comes at a cost with the volatility of inflation. With higher welfare in mon-
etary targeting, the net effect shows that MT fares better. However, when intertemporal
substitution is high (σc = 0.5), RT stabilize both output and inflation, and it also gener-
ates higher welfare. Therefore, RT is better off with low risk aversion.
Similarly, as with the price mark-up, the wage mark-up shock (Figure 2.8) produces
lower output, consumption, employment and investment, whereas the higher real wages
results in higher inflation and marginal cost. Those effects follow the close patterns in both
RT and MT. However, the influences are overall too trivial. In addition, when wage mark-
up shock dominates, money supply targeting stabilises output, consumption, employment
and investment while interest rate targeting produces higher welfare and leads to less
volatile in inflation. Therefore, the net effect implies that RT fares better. When higher
intertemporal substitution is applied, RT stabilises both output and inflation, making the
result unchanged. Thus, RT is better chosen under wage mark-up shock regardless of the
degree of risk aversion.
Money demand shock
Since it is difficult to observe the money demand shock, the AR(1) coefficient and shock
variance are calibrated from previous literature. In this paper, we calibrate the value of
the money demand shock. The calibrated shock is then added into the estimation to ob-
tain the final results. When the money demand increases, both output and consumption
drop, the interest rate must be increased to offset the impacts on inflation. Over time, the
interest rate reduces, leading to a growth of inflation. It can be seen that the influences
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merely enter into MT because the money demand shock is a function of real balance that
is not related to other variables. In MT, real balance is a function of not only money
demand shocks but also inflation. The result is the same as in the CD paper and in Ire-
land (2000), in spite of the magnitudes that are relatively small for inflation, interest rate
and employment. As the money demand shock will have a small effect when the interest
rate is the policy instrument, the model is estimated based on the calibrated value of the
money demand shock.
2.6 Conclusion
In recent decades, most central banks have focused on the interest rate instrument. The
Taylor rule is also extensively applied by most monetary policy studies. However, after
the financial crisis of 2007-8, the zero-lower bond interest rate issue has guided people’s
insights towards reviewing Poole’s analysis. How would full structural stochastic shocks
affect the optimal choice problem? This paper evaluates the optimal choice of alterna-
tive policy instruments through a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model under nine
structural shocks, followed by the Smets and Wouters (2003). The aim is to find the
optimal selection of monetary policy instruments between the interest rate and monetary
aggregates. Some apparent differences have been identified from the SW model. First, this
paper has applied the non-separable money-in-utility function to recapture the importance
of money supply in the DSGE model. Second, the monetary policy implements to peg
either the growth rate of money supply or the interest rate to find the optimal instrument.
The main contribution of this chapter can be described in several ways: (1) This chap-
ter applies a full structural estimated DSGE model into the Poole’s analysis, rather than
what the CD paper uses to calibrate the model. Therefore, the estimated model could
provide more robust results for evaluation. (2) This paper implements welfare which is
derived from the estimated model. The results based on the estimated welfare could also
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be more reasonable. (3) The previous studies evaluate the best policy instrument under
mainly fiscal shocks, money demand shocks and supply shocks, while my study applies a
set of full structural shocks. Having more stochastic disturbances are increasingly impor-
tant as the macroeconomic environment has become more complicated, especially after
the financial crisis. (4) The outcome suggests that the variations of other factors, such as
inflation, consumption, and investment, also matter for the optimal choice of monetary
policy. Therefore, the ranking in this chapter chooses the better-performed instrument
based on both more stable factors and welfare.
This chapter sheds new light on the relative merits of using a monetary aggregate as
opposed to a nominal interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. It does so by using
an estimated DSGE model of the euro area (EA) to conduct an assessment in the spirit
of Poole (1970). The chapter finds that the ranking varies under different disturbances.
Monetary targeting fares better under technology shock, preference shock, and labour
supply shock, independent of the degree of risk aversion. Interest rate targeting is favoured
when intertemporal substitution is low under fiscal shock and equity premium shock. The
interest rate instrument is also chosen when intertemporal substitution is high under
price mark-up shock. Nevertheless, the performance of monetary targeting is improved
when risk aversion is high and is ambiguous when risk aversion is low. Interest rate policy
instruments are chosen under wage mark-up shock regardless of the degree of intertemporal
substitution. Although the interest rate targeting is still a popular instrument, the analysis
in this paper has found the importance of monetary aggregates under some disturbances.
As Hoffmann and Kempa (2009) has suggested the exchange rate targeting outperforms
the monetary targeting in the open economy. Testing whether Poole’s analysis still holds




2.7.1 Welfare Loss Function Derivations
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The lower letters denote the proportional deviations for all variables, such as ct =
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Proof:








βt[C−σ(1− h)−σ(1− βh)C ′t − κN1+φlt]
Take the first-order Taylor series expansion of Z,L,K:
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Those terms with lt, zt, kt−1 are equal to zero, and then the steady-state equations are
given as below:
[(1− h)C]−σ(1− βh)− µ = 0
[(1− h)C]−σ(1− βh) = µ
−1 + (1− δ)β + αβAZ( L
ZK
)1−α − βψ(Z) = 0
− 1
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α(Y + F )zt − ψ′(1)KZzt = 0
Therefore, all first order terms in expansion are zero.
The welfare loss function is then the second-order terms in the Taylor-series expansion
with two expression: the second-order terms in ct, lt and zt, lt, kt−1.
The second-order Taylor series expansion of ct, lt are given respectively: For ct
dUc = (C − hC)−σ
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According to the steady-state equations, κL1+φ can be replaced by the expression
C1−σ(1 − h)−σ(1 − 1η )(1 − α)/cy where cy =
C


























The second part of loss function is the second-order terms from constraints C.17, then
the second-order Taylor series expansion of each variable is given below:
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LK = α(1− α)(Y + F )ltkt−1
Therefore, to sum those second terms up,
dU = −1
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S′′(1)(it − it−1)2 + α(Y + F )atzt + (1− α)(Y + F )atlt + α(Y + F )atkt−1
+α(1− α)(Y + F )ztlt + α2(Y + F )ztkt−1 − ψ′(1)KZztkt−1 + α(1− α)(Y + F )ltkt−1
dU = −1
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Combining the rest terms first order terms and Z = 1, then the second-order term is,





βt[(Y +F )(α(1−α)(lt − kt−1)2 − 2[(1−α)lt + atkt−1]
(at + αzt) + α(1− α)z2t − αatzt) +K[2ψ′(1)ztkt−1 + ψ′′(1)z2t ]− S′′(1)(it − it−1)2]
From the definition ψ = ψ′(1)/ψ′′(1), and the deterministic equilibrium conditions
ψ′(1) = Rk and α(Y + F ) = RkK, ψ
′(1) = Rk =
α(Y+F )
K , then the second component in
utility based welfare loss function is,




















Figure 2.9: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Note: The figure shows the prior (grey lines) and posterior (dark lines) distributions for nine shocks.
Figure 2.10: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Note: The figure shows the prior (grey lines) and posterior (dark lines) distributions for various parameters.
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Figure 2.11: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Note: The figure shows the prior (grey lines) and posterior (dark lines) distributions for various output
gap feedback parameters.
Figure 2.12: Prior and Posterior Distributions









In the past decade, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has triggered a large body of research
on the effects of macroprudential policy, and the interactions between monetary policy and
macroprudential policy. Analysis in this area has involved modifying a standard DSGE
model by including financial frictions, such as a moral hazard problem in firms’ financing
(Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019)). A common finding in this literature is that macro-
prudential policy can help maintain financial stability (Agénor et al. (2013)). However,
their implementation is relatively novel and so the full implication of macroprudential poli-
cies are yet to be determined. Against this backdrop, I study the implications of model
uncertainty, in the form of a policy maker who fears that her model is misspecified, for
optimal macroprudential policy.
There are different approaches to overcome the model misspecification. Given that
models differ, sometimes markedly, in terms of their policy transmission and implications,
those implementing policy would like to ensure against highly adverse outcomes. One ap-
proach to doing so involves robust control, as put forward by Hansen and Sargent (2001).
This approach is desirable when decision makers are faced with uncertainty but cannot
specify a probability distribution over possible specification errors. A key input in the
application of robust control techniques is the reference model. Others like Cateau et al.
(2006) apply the theory of robust control method and the minimax approach. He also
compared different methods for multiple models when dealing with uncertainty.
In this chapter I analyse the implementation of macroprudential policy in a model de-
veloped by Kannan et al. (2012) (KRS hereafter). This is a model with financial frictions
that contains a financial accelerator working through the housing sector. Developments
in the housing market were at the centre of the crisis during the Great Recession, thus it
is important to include this sector.
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Crucially, given the lack of a long historical record with macroprudential policies, it
is not clear whether any model captures the most important transmissions of fiscal and
other shocks. Consequently, there is considerable interest in analysing how a policy maker,
who fears that her model is misspecified, would operate. For this target, we apply the
KRS model with robust macroprudential policy to analyse the central bank’s behaviour.
Through comparisons between the robust monetary policy and non-robust monetary policy
with the macroprudential instrument, our result further confirms that the macroprudential
instrument is a powerful tool to stabilize financial shocks. Moreover, the result suggests
that it is beneficial to identify the source of shocks to ensure how a policy maker can
implement the monetary policy with or without macroprudential policy instrument.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents a robust control method. Section 4 discusses and compares
the results. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
3.2 Literature Overview
This section examines the development of macroprudential policy models, the applications
of model uncertainty, and the linkage between robust control theory and macroprudential
policy.
3.2.1 Understanding macroprudential policy
According to the various financial friction mechanisms below, several papers regarding
macroprudential policy would be surveyed. First, some papers have used collateral con-
straint as the primary financial friction. For general studies, credit is modelled as a
determinant of either physical capital accumulation or housing investment since there is
existing asymmetric information in the financial market. Therefore, borrowers can issue
credit only up to the value of their collateral. The availability and the cost of credit have
an impact on aggregate demand, the output gap and inflation. We can, therefore, use
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such models to analyse how macroprudential policies may influence credit developments
and price stability.
In Agénor et al. (2013)(AAPS), the macroeconomic stability is measured through the
output gap and inflation, and financial stability is measured by three indicators: real house
prices, the credit-to-GDP ratio and the loan spread. The AAPS paper develops a closed
economy model with six types of agents and two alternative policy rules, which include
a standard Taylor type interest rate rule augmented to account for additional variable
credit growth and a countercyclical regulatory rule with capital requirements which are
also connected to credit growth. There are two appealing outcomes. One is that the
combination of a credit-augmented interest rate rule and a Basel III-type countercyclical
capital requirement rule could be optimal for mitigating economic volatilities, even if mon-
etary policy reacts strongly to inflation deviations from the target. The other shows that
the sensitivity of the regulatory rule to credit growth gaps is related to the degree of pol-
icy interest rate smoothing and the level of policymakers’ concern with financial stability.
Unlike AAPS, we apply a model with committed optimal policy. The macroprudential
policy is applied using the robust control method to analyze the impacts on the economy.
By introducing technology shocks or financial shocks, Angelini et al. (2011) (ANP) re-
searched the influences and outcomes of the macroprudential policies and their interactions
with monetary policy. The research used the mechanism of financial frictions, including
collateral constraint and LTV under two circumstances: co-operation and non-cooperation
between monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
ANP applies an estimated DSGE model by incorporating the banking sector. For one
of the financial friction mechanisms in this model, banks attempt to keep the capital-asset
ratio close to a capital requirement target level. When loans increase, the capital-asset ra-
tio declines below the capital requirement level, leading to growth in the lending rate. This
then drops the demand for credit. For the LTV ratio, the collateral constraint is tightened
when the housing market shrinks, and the borrowers’ ability to finance consumption and
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housing investment is decreased. Moreover, ANP devises the monetary policy through
a Taylor rule and macroprudential policy through two instruments. The interaction be-
tween monetary policy and macroprudential policy represents two situations: under the
co-operation case, both macroprudential authority and the central bank minimize the
same objective function; under the non-cooperation case, each authority minimizes their
loss function.
As a result, when technology shocks are the main driving force for the economy, macro-
prudential policy has limited effect on macroeconomic stability. Additionally, the lack of
co-operation between the macroprudential authority and the central bank could poten-
tially create different policies, leading to excessive volatility. When financial shocks are
the core driver of macroeconomic fluctuations, co-operation between macroprudential pol-
icy authorities and the central bank could mitigate volatilities in the economy, stabilizing
output and the loans-to-output ratio. Finally, their studies recommend that macropruden-
tial policy should be treated as a helpful complement to the traditional monetary policies
for dealing with financial shocks. By contrast with ANP’s model, we apply a DSGE model
with housing market through the collateral constraint accelerator mechanism. However,
we also consider model uncertainty by including robust control method when the central
bank concern the model misspecification issues.
In contrast, Beau et al. (2012) (BCM) also investigates the interactions between mon-
etary policy and macroprudential policy. By applying an estimated DSGE model for both
the Euro area and the US data, they aim to identify whether monetary and macropru-
dential policies have mixed, neutral or conflicting influences on price stability. In terms
of inflation dynamics, they compare different policy rules that depend on the monetary
policy objectives and the financial stability objective within the implementation of macro-
prudential policy.
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) (BBKM) explored whether the macroprudential policy
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can contribute the stability in the peripheral countries in the Euro area. By building
a two-country DSGE model, BBKM found that macroprudential policy is efficient only
by applying individually for each region. Moreover, like the other research, macropruden-
tial policy is found to be helpful under financial shocks and housing market-related shocks.
There are some more other papers have studied macroprudential policy in the Euro
area as well, such as Pariès et al. (2011). They have examined an estimated DSGE model
by incorporating some demand and supply credit frictions, applying the risk-sensitive cap-
ital requirements policy instruments to highlight the importance of the policy instruments.
There are also a large number of papers that have followed Bernanke et al. (1999)’s
financial accelerator mechanism to explore the effects and interactions between monetary
policy and macroprudential policies. Bailliu et al. (2015) studied the performance of dif-
ferent policies under financial imbalances. They showed that there would be welfare gain
when policymakers respond to financial imbalances using both monetary policy and pru-
dential instruments, especially in the presence of financial shocks. Other papers applied
this type of financial friction, such as Kannan et al. (2012) , Quint and Rabanal (2013) and
Suh (2012). This research applies the KRS model to examine prudential policy under un-
certainty, which we discuss more in section (3). Unlike most papers that have concentrated
on technology shocks, housing market-related shocks, or financial shocks, Lambertini et al.
(2013) have investigated the effects of macroprudential policy under news-driven shocks.
They distinguish the influences of both interest rate and LTV policies, implying that opti-
mal policy for borrowers is satisfied by an LTV ratio responds counter-cyclically to credit
growth as this could stabilize credit relative to output. The optimal policy for savers is
characterized by a constant LTV ratio coupled with an interest-rate response to growth.
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3.2.2 The applications of model uncertainty
As the robust control theory is one technique from the uncertainty study, it is fundamen-
tal to understand various model uncertainty theories before the application of the robust
control method. Increasing researchers have extended the studies on the relations between
model uncertainties and policy decisions. Cateau (2007) identified several approaches to
deal with model uncertainty. He summarised them as the robust control method; the
Bayesian approach; the worst-case model approach; and the trade-off approach. A robust
control method is a powerful tool when policymakers have a good model of the economy.
It is devised to select decision rules that perform well in a neighbourhood of a specific
model. However, he also implies that the Bayesian approach, worst-case model approach
and the trade-off method are more suitable tools when policymakers confront more than
one reference model. This is because those approaches take into account the fact that
policymakers could use models which are arbitrarily far from each other.
For the worst-case approach, policymakers’ objective is to guarantee that the policy
decision rule performs reasonably well regardless of which model of the economy is cor-
rect. Policymakers examine the policy choices and decide which model do not perform
well under each of these choices. Then they choose to minimize the variability of choice
irrespective of which model is the true model. For the trade-off method proposed by
Cateau (2007), there are two assumptions. One is that policymakers can assign weights
to the models in the decision sets, the other is that policymakers recognize their degree of
aversion towards the across-model risk, which indicates the risk is associated with multiple
models. Policymakers allow across-model risk by analysing the performance of a model
both by its loss and the degree of aversion towards the across-model risk.
The main distinction between the Bayesian approach, worst-case approach and trade-
off approach is the different assumptions concerning the attitude of policymakers toward
model uncertainty. The Bayesian technique presumes that policymakers are across-model
risk-neutral, meaning zero across-model risk aversion. They only care about the average
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performance of models. In contrast, the worst-case model approach presumes that poli-
cymakers are the across-model risk aversion infinity. This implies that policymakers only
care about how the policy choice is. The trade-off method allows the aversion of policy-
makers to change between zero and infinity. Then the degree of policymakers’ risk version
determines how much policymakers’ average trade-off performance is for robustness.
In a Bayesian technique, the planner applies his prior probability distribution over
models, so the researcher needs to specify a prior over all possible models, which can
quickly become problematic. The early representative work is from Brainard (1967)who
considers the scenario where policymakers confront parameters uncertainty that is relevant
for choosing an appropriate policy. While they still know the probability distribution in
terms of which they are selected. If policymakers are informed of parameters’ distribution,
then they can obtain the expected losses resulting from different policies. Brainard found
the smallest expected loss in solved policy and explained that when policymakers are scep-
tical about the impact on their moves, the best response to uncertainty is to restrain the
extent to which they should react to the news they get.
3.2.3 The linkage between robust control theory and macroprudential
policy
An alternative approach to model uncertainty is to consider a minimax rule with Wald
(1950). It is difficult for policymakers to know probability distributions in different models,
while the minimax method can avoid this problem. This method implies that policymak-
ers should minimize the maximum loss of the worst-case under all potential scenarios.
Therefore, the application of the minimax approach in macroeconomic decision problems
is often considered as a robust control method and the policy that minimizes the worst
scenario loss is referred to as a robust policy (Barlevy (2011)).
However, even approaches of model uncertainty are varied, early applications of robust-
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ness did have one result in common: In all of these applications, the robust policy tended
to contradict the attenuation result in Brainard’s model. It instead implied that uncer-
tain policymakers should react more aggressively to news than they would in the absence
of uncertainty. Examples of this result include Hansen and Sargent (1999), and Onatski
and Stock (2002), Giannoni (2002), Onatski and Williams (2003), Hansen and Sargent
(2001, 2008), Giordani and Söderlind (2004), Dennis et al. (2009), andDennis (2007), and
Leitemo and Söderström (2008). These findings were sometimes interpreted to mean that
concern for robustness leads to a more aggressive policy. In those papers, Hansen and
Sargent (2008) have provided a full explanation of robust control theory, including both
control and estimation issues, and both one-agent and multiple-agent settings in terms of
model specification.
Furthermore, Giordani and Söderlind (2004) extend Hansen and Sargent’s research by
providing solutions for the robust control methods under the discretion and simple rules
scenarios. By applying the robust control technique into the New Keynesian model, they
find some typical result: robust monetary policy is more aggressive not only in the com-
mitment solution but also in the discretionary case. Additionally, their result suggests
that robustness can grow the inflation bias in the discretionary equilibrium. This outcome
confirms Hansen and Sargent (2002) ’s research but fear of misspecification increases the
inflation bias in the DSGE model. At last, they recommend that robustness in the private
sector increases the volatility of inflation and output, and this can provide an incentive
for central banks to release transparent forecasts.
Moreover,Giannoni (2002) is closer to Hansen and Sargent in that the planner is solving
for the minimax method. He assumes that policymakers have multiple priors concerning
the probability distribution of the true model, and they are uncertainty risk-averse. He
compares the robust optimal Taylor rule to the optimal monetary policy without model
uncertainty. The result suggests that the central bank should allow a more aggressive pol-
icy to stabilize inflation and the output gap around their target values and ensures that
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welfare losses are included. Onatski and Stock (2002) apply the Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1999) (henceforward, the RS model) two-equation model with minimax approach of
robust control theory. Their research concerns two main issues. One is to compare how
robust monetary policies differ from policies without parameter uncertainty. The other
one questions whether different perturbations in different formulations of the robust con-
trol is relevant for monetary policy applications. Then at the outcome, they confirm that
the robust monetary policy is more aggressive under model uncertainty. For the second
question, they indicate that the formulations of specific robust control rules vary depend-
ing on whether it is an error, model uncertainty, or both. What is more, for the same
RS model application, Onatski and Williams (2003) examine specifically three types of
uncertainty model by utilizing the ”Model-Error Modelling” approach: parameters un-
certainty of the reference model; the following correlation properties of shocks; and data
quality uncertainty. Their result shows that aggressive monetary policy might be caused
by overemphasizing uncertainty concerning economic dynamics at low frequencies.
Most studies discussed have applied a minimax approach within different models. How-
ever, many of these methods require that the reference model is described in a state-space
form. This makes it difficult when some models cannot be written in that form, typically
for medium-scale to large-scale models. By using Dennis et al. (2009) ’s structural form
methods, Leitemo and Söderström (2008) and Dennis et al. (2007) study a small open
economy model which also shows that the central bank responds more aggressively to
price markup shocks in the both domestic and import sector. In previous literature, most
research is dealt with monetary policy and are incorporating different models based on the
new Keynesian model. The study related to robust control on the macroprudential policy
has been largely neglected. Bahaj et al. (2017) applies Brainard method to the case of
macroprudential policy; while no other research has attempted to apply the robust control
method for the macroprudential policy uncertainty issue. To analyze the macropruden-
tial policy instruments’ implementation and transmission, Bahaj et al. (2017) extends the
Brainard model and suggests that learning about uncertain policy tools and concentrating
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on risk avoidance would corporate with more active policy-making. Additionally, uncer-
tainty in the private sector over the financial stability objective, reaction function, and
preferences might reduce the power of the signalling influence of macroprudential policy,
demanding a more aggressive policy.
Therefore, it is of interest to explore the robust control approach with the macropru-
dential policy by using Dennis et al. (2009) structural form. Instead of the simple New
Keynesian model, or the RS two-equation model, we put forth an optimal macroprudential
policy with commitment in a more general DSGE model with financial accelerator effects.
3.2.4 The Kannan et al. (2012) model
The KRS model, which we apply in this paper, is modified from the standard New Key-
nesian model of Gaĺı (2007) and closely related to Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and Monacelli (2009). The main aim of the KRS model is to examine how can
monetary policy with macroprudential instruments reduce the volatility of housing booms
under financial shocks. There are some fundamental features worth noting to introduce
the KRS model.
Unlike the classic New Keynesian model, the households in this model comprise savers
and borrowers who are consuming durables and nondurable goods. There are some ba-
sic assumptions. First, households choose the quantity of both investing in the housing
market and consuming in nondurable goods. Second, the borrowers obtain funds from the
savers through financial intermediaries, which charge the spread that depends on the net
worth of borrowers. Third, the lending rate is dependent upon the macroprudential policy
instrument, loan-to-value ratios, indicating that the markup is charged through the mon-
etary policy rate, and the policy rate. Both the change of house prices and credit market
conditions can contribute to the acceleration in investment, nondurable consumption and
consumer prices. In other dimensions, the KRS model follows the standard New Keyne-
sian principles. In both the durables and non-durables sectors, there exists monopolistic
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competition and nominal rigidities. The model contains other conventional assumptions,
such as sticky prices, external habit, and adjustment costs. The detailed KRS model
equations are shown in Appendix.
I choose the KRS model for several reasons. First, the KRS paper is part of the recent
literature on macroprudential policies within DEGE models by incorporating financial ac-
celerator effects. The KRS model finds out that macroprudential policies are an effective
tool to stabilize financial shocks, especially with credit and asset price booms. Second,
the KRS model implies that the macroprudential policy instrument performs well on im-
proving macroeconomic stability under reasonable different parameter values. Third, they
apply aggressive optimal monetary policy reaction parameters on stabilizing CPI inflation
and the output gap. The simulation results indicate that the macroprudential instrument
becomes increasingly fundamental when the policymakers become more aggressive and
care about stabilizing real activities. Fourth, the KRS result also suggests that it is cru-
cial to identify the source of house price booms and financial conditions for the design of
the monetary and macroprudential policy.
The first two points show the critical role of macroprudential policy in the KRS model.
The third point provides a link between the KRS model and the robust control method.
In light of previous literature reviews, the robust monetary policy leads to more aggressive
policies under commitment. It would be of our interest to evaluate how the robust control
method on the KRS model would generate impacts on macroprudential policies. The final
point indicates that the robust control method is appropriate for the model as the robust
control are beneficial for policymakers concerning about model misspecification.
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3.3 The Robust Control Method
3.3.1 The intuition behind robust control
The model equations in the last section estimated by the central bank are called reference
model, which provides the best guess for the data generating process. When the central
bank is concerned that the reference model is misspecified, it could apply the robust
policy against the distortion generating the approximating model. The intuition can be
explained through figure (3.1). Given that a central bank recognizes the presence of model
misspecification, an unreliable approximating model fα0 is surrounded by a set of unknown
true data generating process. One unspecified element of true data generating process is
model f . The central bank must base their decisions on the only specified model, fα0 . The
decision-maker is seeking a decision rule that would perform well as for the approximating
model as for a set of models surrounding model fα0 when f 6= fα0 . It is presumed that the
specification errors function I(α0, f) is bounded by a certain value η, and I(α0, f) 6 η.
Therefore, the value η shows that how much the decision-maker believes that fα0 is a good
approximating model. A larger value of η indicates that the decision-maker believes the
true model is further apart and considers a wider set of the model around fα0 and vice
versa.
3.3.2 The robust policy equations
The robust control approach was developed by Hansen and Sargent (2001) and extended
by Giordani and Söderlind (2004). This paper applies the method that is modified by
Dennis et al. (2009) who have proposed a structural-form approach to solving robust
control problems.
The reference model above can be written in structural form:
A0yt = A1yt−1 +A2Etyt+1 +A3ut +A4εt +A5εt+1 (3.1)
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Figure 3.1: Robust decision making
Notes: A decision-maker specifies an approximating model fα0 doubts that the true data generated by a
nearby model f, which cannot be specified. α0 denotes the specification error, and η denotes the constraint,
which summarises the policymaker’s confidence level. I(α0, f) 6 η. (Hansen and Sargent (2008): ch.1,
P10; Cateau et al. (2006))
where yt is a vector of all endogenous variables; ut is a vector of policy instruments; εt
denotes a vector of all shocks; A0, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 must have dimensions consistent with
yt, ut and εt; A0 is assumed to be non-singular. It is presumed that the shocks, st, follows
the process
st = Φst−1 + Ωεt (3.2)
where |Φ| < 1 and the shocks are distributed by a normal distribution where εt is i.i.d.[0,1].
There are two circumstances under assumptions. One states that agents make decisions
after observing shocks st. Then the timing of the equation (3.2) moves forward by one
period and st is included within equation with yt−1; then A4 = 0, and A5 = [Ω
′ 0′]′. The
other assumes that agents make decisions before observing the shocks st, the timing of the
equation above keeps the same form and st−1 is included within yt−1; then A4 = [Ω
′ 0′]′;
A5 = 0. This only considers the previous situation.
To deal with the concern of the central bank for the model misspecification problems,
the specification errors are introduced to obtain the distorted model. It is assumed that
one evil agent chooses the distorted errors to maximize the loss function. By assuming the
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expectational errors, εyt+1 = yt+1−Etyt+1 is a linear function of the shocks in equilibrium,
εyt+1 = Cεt+1, then equation (3.1) is modified as,
A0yt = A1yt−1 +A2yt+1 +A3ut +A4εt + (A5 −A2C)εt+1 (3.3)
where the matrix C will be determined later. Then, equation (3.3) can be expressed with
specification errors as follows:
A0yt = A1yt−1 +A2yt+1 +A3ut +A4(εt + vt) + (A5 −A2C)(vt+1 + εt+1) (3.4)
where vt denotes the sequence of specification errors. When distorted specification error





βtv′tvt ≤ η (3.5)
where η ∈ [0, η̄) implies the whole budget is subject to misspecification.







When the central bank formulates policy to against the distorted model, the policymaker







tRut − θv′tvt] (3.7)
where θ, the multiplier is inversely related to the misspecification constraint η. When θ
converges to infinity, the specification errors tend to become smaller and smaller, until the
robust decision issue becomes a non-robust decision problem. The W and R are matrices
containing policy weights and are assumed to be symmetric and positive semi-definite and
symmetric and positive definite, respectively.
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βt{y′tWyt + u′tRut − θv′tvt + 2λt[A1yt−1 +A2yt+1 +A3ut
+A4(εt + vt) + (A5 −A2C)(vt+1 + εt+1)−A0yt]}
(3.8)
where λt includes all the Lagrange multipliers. When decisions are made after observing
the shocks, st is included the equation yt−1 and A4 = 0, the decision-maker and private
agents are fully convinced in their knowledge of the current state variables. Given the first
order conditions with respect to λt, yt, ut, vt,
∂L
∂λt
: A1yt−1 +A2Etyt+1 +A3ut + (A5 −A2C)vt+1 +A5εt+1 −A0yt = 0; (3.9)
∂L
∂yt
: Wyt + βA
′
1Etλt+1 + β





3λt = 0; (3.11)
∂L
∂vt+1
: −βθvt+1 + (A5 −A2C)′λt = 0; (3.12)























To obtain the worst-case equilibrium, C is updated according to C ←− MWyy S where S is
the selection matrix from the sides of MWyy associated with the shocks and iterate through
equations (3.9) to (3.16) until a fix-point is reached. As the shocks st enters the equation
yt−1, all of the variables in equations (3.13) to (3.16) respond to st therefore to εt. Now
74
Chapter 3




ut = Fzzt−1 (3.18)
vt+1 = Kzzt−1 (3.19)
where zt ≡ [λ′t y′t]′. Therefore, once the worst-case equilibrium is achieved, the approx-
imating equilibrium is derived from equation (3.1) (withA4 = 0) jointly with equations




ut = Fzzt−1 (3.21)
3.3.3 Detection-error probabilities
The multiplier θ is calibrated through a detection-error probability method. It shows
the probability when the econometricians make inaccurate inferences whether the worst-
case equilibrium or approximating equilibrium generated the data. When the value of θ
is small, larger distinctions between the distorted model and the reference model occur,
these can be easily detected. For instance, model A shows the approximating model and
model W denotes the worst-case model. With the assumption of equal weight attached to
each model, then the probability detection error is given by
p(θ) =
prob(A|W ) + prob(W |A)
2
(3.22)
where prob(A|W ) illustrates the probability that econometricians erroneously choose model
A when in fact the data is generated by the model W. The same explanation applies for
the prob(W |A). p(θ) provides a lower bound on the probability of making a detection
error. It is presumed that the econometricians’ choice over model selection is based on the
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likelihood ratio principle. {zWt }T1 specifies a finite sequence of results generated in terms
of the worst-case equilibrium, model W. The likelihood related to the models A and W are
denoted by LAW and LWW , respectively. When log(
LWW
LAW
) < 0, the econometricians se-
lect model A over model W. According to this, there are M independent sequences {zWt }T1
generated through the process, the probability prob(A|W ) can be achieved through the
equation below,







) < 0] (3.23)
where the function I[log(
LmWW
LmAW
) < 0] is an indicator function belongs to [0 1]. The function
equals one if its statement is satisfied and equals zero if it is not satisfied. The probability
prob(W |A) is obtained applying draws generated from the approximating model. In the
likelihood function to generate probability prob(W |A) and prob(A|W ) , the shocks are
assumed to be normally distributed.
To achieve detection error probabilities and take into account of the distortions to both







determine equilibrium results under the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case
equilibrium, respectively. When NA 6= NW , the detection error probability p(θ) is calcu-
lated as follows: First, it allows for the stochastic singularity that generally characterizes
equilibrium; second, it accounts suitable Jacobian transformation that is included the
likelihood function. Through the QR decomposition, NA is decomposed according to
NA = QARA and N
W is decomposed according to NW = QWRW . QA and QW are
orthogonal matrices and RA and RW are upper triangular. Let the equation
ε̂t




t−1), {i, j} ∈ {A,W} (3.26)
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show the inferred shocks in period t when model i is fitted to data {zjt }T1 that are obtained
in terms of model j; and let
∑̂i|j




























where tr is the trace operator.
With equations (3.27) and (3.28), equation (3.23) is used to estimate prob(A—W) and
prob(W—A) that are required to construct the detection error probability, as in equation
(3.22) . The multiplier, θ is then specified by choosing a detection-error probability and
inverting equation (3.22). Svensson (2000) stresses the issue to choose θ as the robust
control method’s disadvantage. The choice of θ is therefore fundamental as the planner’s
policy function differs with it. According to Giordani and Söderlind (2004), zero robust-
ness is compatible with a detection-error probability of 50%. Hansen and Sargent (2000)
recommends the range lies between 10% and 20%. Normally, 150 observations correspond
to a detection-error probability of 20%. The larger the sample, the higher θ, the uncer-
tainty around the reference model becomes smaller. In this paper, the detection-error
probability θ is calibrated as 20%.
3.4 Robust Control Macroprudential Policy in the KRS model
The structural form robust control method would be applied to the KRS model in this
section. The model is solved under full commitment. We presume that the monetary
policy is aimed to stabilise the annualised CPI inflation (π̄t), the level of the output gap
(xt) and the annualised nominal interest rate (r̃t). Therefore, the central bank’s objective
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where π̄t = 4πt, r̃t = 4rt, xt = yt − y∗. The variable y∗ is the level of output in the
flexible-price equilibrium. The weighted parameters show the central bank’s preferences
for output gap and interest rate: λy = 0.5, λr = 0.2, β = 0.99.
Table (3.1) gives the calibrated parameters for the model. The calibrated parameters are
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
β savers’ discount factor 0.99
βB borrowers’ discount factor 0.98
δ depreciation rate 0.025
λ share of savers 0.5
χ down payment rate (1− LTV ) 0.2
σ
σ−1 average markup 1.1
lL labour disutility of switching sectors 1
ϕ inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
ε external habit proportionate parameter 0.8
η adjustment cost residential investment 0.5
κ elasticity of spread with respect to net worth 0.05
α Share of nonduables in production parameter 0.9
θc Calvo lottery nondurable 0.75
θd Calvo lottery durable 0.75
φc backward looking behaviour in nondurable section 1
φd backward looking behaviour in durable section 1
τ macroprudential coeffiecient on credit growth 0.3
ρa AR(1) coefficient on technology shock 0.98
ρv AR(1) coefficient on financial shock 0.95
ρd AR(1) coefficient on housing demand shock 0.95
γπ Taylor rule coefficient on inflation 1.3
γy Taylor rule coefficient on output gap 0.125
γb Augmented Taylor rule with macroprudential policy coefficient 0.7
γr Augmented Taylor rule coefficient on credit growth 0.7
σa standard deviation in technology shock 1.5
σv standard deviation in financial shock 0.125
σd standard deviation in housing demand shock 2.5
Note: The calibrated parameters are cited from the Kannan et al. (2012) model
cited from the KRS model, which are based on Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The parame-
ters are adjusted to match the relevant second moments in the data. It can be seen that
savers are more patient than borrowers (β > βB); therefore, they have a higher discount
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factor. The parameter κ is calibrated to be 0.05, measuring the size of the financial accel-
erator effect. Most crucially, τ is the macroprudential policy coefficient, which is assumed
to be 0.3. A higher value of this policy coefficient would imply that policymakers care
more about financial stability. As mentioned in the KRS model, the optimal weight on
the macroprudential policy instrument drops to 0.16, when the policymaker care similarly
between the CPI inflation and the output gap. Since the main target of central banks are
inflation stabilization, it is reasonable to apply 0.3 on macroprudential instrument. All
shocks are assumed to be persistent in high values.
In the next part, we discuss and compare the model with and without the macropru-
dential policy in the KRS model. We show the three results from robust control method:
the worst-case model, the approximating model, and the rational expectations model.
We assume that the policy is set after observing the shocks, then concentrating on the
circumstance where a monetary policy with or without macroprudential policy and the
specification errors are selected under commitment. The robust control method is then
applied to devise the robust monetary and macroprudential policy that guard against dis-
tortions to the reference model.
Outcomes would be shown in four dimensions. The first part shows the benchmark
case, where the outcomes without robustness but with or without macroprudential policy.
The second section gives a robust model with interest rate rule but without macropru-
dential policy. The third section provides a robust model with interest rate rule and with
exogenous macroprudential policy. The fourth part shows the robust model with both
interest rate rule and macroprudential policy.
3.4.1 Benchmark: The non-robust model (Rational Expectations)
When there is no robust control method applied to the model, the central bank imple-
ments the monetary policy with or without the macroprudential instrument to stabilize
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the economy. Figure (3.2) presents the benchmark case where the KRS model without
robustness when the monetary policy is applied with and without macroprudential policy.
In all illustrated graphs later in this chapter, the first column shows the impulse responses
under a one standard deviation technology shock (εA). The second and the third depict
the outcomes under a one standard deviation housing demand shock (εD) and financial
shock (εv), respectively.
In terms of Figure (3.2), the impulse responses under the non-robust policy without a
macroprudential policy are illustrated by the solid lines. First, under positive technology
shock, the innovation of technology lowers marginal cost and CPI inflation. As for the
response, the central bank lowers the nominal policy rate to offset the fall in inflation.
All variables go back to the steady-state after overshooting process. Second, under hous-
ing demand shock, increasing demand for housing generates higher residential investment
and housing prices. This leads to higher output. With constant potential production,
therefore, causing a higher output gap. To respond to those influences, the central bank
lifts policy rate to calm the economy down and reduce the output gap. Thirdly, the
financial shock gives the most different responses between the model with and without
the macroprudential policy. When financial shocks hit the economy, to respond to an
increase in housing prices, the central bank increases the policy rate. As collateral val-
ues soar, credit market also grows; therefore, banks are assumed to lower the lending rates.
On the other aspect of Figure (3.2), the dashed lines present the non-robust model
with macroprudential policy. The most distinctive differences can be seen from the im-
pulse response of financial shocks. The macroprudential policy has offset the impacts on
the financial shocks, as all those variables stay at the steady-state level. Furthermore,
under technology shock, both the output gap and inflation are more stable than they are
without a macroprudential policy case. Under housing demand shocks, the central bank
responds less when using the policy rate, which generates lower volatility in the output




Overall, impulse responses for the non-robust policy show that the central bank ac-
tively implements interest rate or macroprudential policy to stabilise the economy. The
macroprudential policy generates the most significant impacts on financial shocks.
3.4.2 The robust model without the macroprudential policy (τ̂t = 0)
Without the macroprudential policy, the mechanism is mainly driven by the interest rate
instrument. Comparing the KRS model with standard Taylor rule, the case of the rational
expectation under commitment with an optimal policy is more stable for the interest rate
and CPI inflation. This shows the advantage that the central bank has when it is commit-
ted to optimal policy rules. In this section, we present the results where the KRS model
is applied with robust control technique but without macroprudential policy. Figure (3.3)
presents the responses of three shocks between the approximating equilibrium (continu-
ous solid lines), the worst-case scenario (dashed dot lines), and the rational expectations
equilibrium (dashed lines). The policy is set after observing the shocks. When robustness
is introduced into the model, the central bank is always concerned that the economy will
fluctuate more in response to the shocks. The detailed explanations come next.
To comprehend the influences of robustness on monetary policy, we first study the
worst-case model for inflation, output gap, policy interest rate, nominal debt growth and
lending rate. This equilibrium is appealing since it depicts the central bank’s worst fears
of model misspecification, thus, contribute to our understanding for the device of the ro-
bust policy. Under positive technology shock, there is one immediate increase in output.
Also, households consumption, residential investment, housing price all rise. Higher pro-
ductivity improves efficiency, therefore leading a decline in CPI goods inflation. Since the
growth of output is lower than flexible-level output, generating a negative output gap at
the beginning. As a response of the central bank, monetary policy is expanded first by
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reducing the interest rate from the beginning to seven periods. This leads to higher output
and the positive output gap, consumption, residential investment, and credit growth. The
CPI inflation also increases and return to the steady-state level. To offset the boom in
inflation and decrease the output gap, therefore, the central bank then lifts the interest
rate, leading to a drop in real GDP, consumption, and investment.
Under housing demand shocks, the worst-case monetary policy responses aggressively
for output gap, growth in debt, both the policy interest rate and the lending rate. When
housing demand increases, the central bank fears that the CPI inflation would accelerate
more than it appears, leading a more active policy reaction in the interest policy rate and
lending rate. Under financial shocks, variables fluctuate as the interest rate instrument
plays an important role. The central bank fears that the worst-case financial shocks hit the
economy, then increasing the interest rate gradually more than it is in the approximating
model. This turns out that the intermediaries lower lending rate more and are reluctant
to lend to firms. To overcome adverse impacts, the central bank must drop the policy rate
later to boost the economy.
Furthermore, we find that the approximating equilibriums are more volatile than the
case of rational expectation. After recognizing when the technology shock hits the econ-
omy, policymakers fear that the influences would be larger due to the existence of the
model distortions. With the booming economy, there are increases in output, residential
investment, and credit growth, and the central bank becomes concerned that the impacts
would be more persistent than rational expectation cases. Therefore, the corresponding
interest rate drops deeper at the beginning of a few periods. Moreover, the figure illus-
trates that the largest impacts from the robust monetary policy occur in areas concerning
the lending rate, housing price inflation, and nominal debt growth. With more active
reaction on those variables, the interest rate is tightened more than it would under the
rational expectation model. Therefore, this brings about a contraction in consumption,
investment, and real GDP. The cost to ensure against the model misspecification comes
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in the form of higher volatility in the inflation and output gap.
3.4.3 The robust model with the exogenous macroprudential policy (τ̂t =
0.3)
This section would introduce the robust model with the exogenous macroprudential policy
when the policy coefficient is equal to 0.3 as in the KRS model. Figure (3.4) illustrates the
worst-case equilibrium against the approximating equilibrium and rational expectations
under commitment to the optimal policy. In contrast with approximating equilibrium, the
figure shows similar movements in terms of the worst-case equilibrium. There are some
crucial points that can be drawn. First, the worst-case equilibrium is also more volatile
than the approximating equilibrium for all variables. This is since the robust policymakers
fear the specification errors are as damaging as possible that shocks have a larger impact
on those variables, so acting with more aggressive policy response. Second, consumption,
residential investment and output have larger magnitude impacts compared to the other
variables under technology shock. Third, the CPI inflation declines at the beginning and
grows continuously after three periods. To respond the growth of productivity, the robust
central bank fears larger and persistent volatility in consumption, residential investment,
output, housing price inflation and credit growth, responding with a more aggressive ex-
pansionary policy, leading larger growth in output gap and inflation.
When housing demand shocks hit the economy, there are some immediate impacts:
increasing in housing price inflation, output, residential investment, and output gap; and
declining in total consumption and CPI inflation. Durable goods consumption grows as
the preference for investing more in the housing market. However, private nondurable
goods decrease more, generate an overall decline in total consumption. After policymak-
ers observe the housing demand shock, the booming housing market corresponds with
tightened monetary policy. The higher policy rate leads to a contraction in consumption,
investment, real GDP. Moreover, reducing housing price inflation is correlated with a re-
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duction in nominal credit growth as the willingness of borrowing cools down.
In addition, the robust policymakers should respond with more aggressive monetary
policy. Given the drop in investment, housing price, and lending rate after five periods,
the central bank fears that impacts of shrinking housing demand would be persistent and
larger than expected, therefore generating a gentle expansionary monetary policy under
the approximating equilibrium. It can be seen that the overall impacts between the ap-
proximating equilibrium and the rational expectation case are similar. This is since the
committed optimal policy coordinates with the shocks. However, the magnitudes under
housing demand shock are actually quite trivial for inflation, lending rate and the mone-
tary policy interest rate. The result implies that the monetary policy itself has a limited
response in terms of the housing demand shock.
What about the worst-case scenario? This indeed brings about more significant im-
pacts after five periods of time between the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case
equilibrium. As before, the worst-case scenario provides more volatile movements than the
other. The central bank’s fear over model distortions generates more aggressive monetary
policy. Nonetheless, the magnitudes are still small for interest rate, CPI inflation and
lending rate. Therefore, even with the worst-case equilibrium, the monetary policy does
not respond to the housing demand shock.
Similar to in the KRS model, the financial shock can be seen as an increasing perceived
lending risk, bringing about an immediate drop in housing price inflation and residential
investment. The impact on housing price is actually extremely small. Under optimal
policy commitment, it is assumed that the banks lower the lending rate. Thus, higher
collateral constraint allows borrowers to take out more loans. This works through the
credit accelerator mechanism. Moreover, higher interest rate contracts the demand for
nondurable consumption goods by borrowers, leading to a fall in total consumption. With
higher interest rate monetary policy, the influence on CPI inflation is not significant, but
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the output gap indeed declines.
Moreover, after the central bank observes the financial shock, it formulates a tighter
monetary policy that reduces the CPI inflation, real GDP and output gap. The impulse
responses illustrate that the largest gap between the approximating equilibrium and the
rational expectation model is shown in the output gap and real GDP. The other variables
do not make big differences even when the central bank fears the model misspecification.
Finally, as for the worst-case scenario, the central bank fears the shock would pose
many large impacts and then devises interest rate more volatile than approximating equi-
librium after overshooting period. In terms of the worst-case equilibrium, the central
banks fear the model misspecification is as damaging as possible. Therefore, there are
larger reactions on consumption, output and output gap. To respond to those reactions,
the central bank increases the interest rate more aggressively than the approximating equi-
librium. Consequently, the monetary policy generates a dramatic drop in the output gap,
but the overall impacts on CPI inflation are still trivial.
Under commitment, the central bank clings to the optimal policy. It can be sum-
marised that the interest rate policy with robustness can be more easily detected under
the technology shock as the larger impacts under the approximating equilibrium and the
worst-case equilibrium. Contrast that with the result from the KRS models, when the
model is based on the simple Taylor interest rate rule, and there are still some distinc-
tions. First, the clearest advantage is that the robust monetary policy under commitment
is less volatile, leading to lower welfare losses. Second, monetary policy instrument gener-
ates an opposite direction between inflation and the output gap under commitment rather
than the same direction under the Taylor rule. Therefore, the main target of the central
bank matters more in the commitment case with robustness.
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3.4.4 The Robust model with endogenous macroprudential policy
This section analyses the results for the KRS model that include the macroprudential
policy. The impulse responses are shown in Figure (3.5). The economy is affected by both
monetary policy and macroprudential policy instrument when the macroprudential policy
is implemented.
We begin the analysis with the financial shock when the macroprudential policy is
included in the rational expectations model as the second policy instrument. It has been
shown that the results are quite different from the previous one that was without macro-
prudential policy. When the macroprudential policy instrument is applied, the responses
of all variables to financial shock are zero. This implies that the new instrument itself or
coordination with monetary policy together is able to fully offset the financial shock.
Furthermore, the increased productivity leads to a housing market boom: output and
the demand for credit all rise immediately. The lower housing price decreases the collat-
eral constraint, limiting borrowers’ credit growth. After the central bank observes financial
shock, it drops the interest rate, leading an increase in CPI inflation and the output gap.
The growing lending rate brings about a drop in real credit growth due to the increasing
borrowing cost. When the lending rate goes back to the steady-state, it generates a wide-
spread acceleration in credit growth. Interestingly, with the macroprudential instrument
under commitment, the central bank does not have to react strongly as it recognizes the
new instrument is also implemented to stabilize the output gap and inflation. Therefore,
rather than sticking to the Taylor rule, the benefits of the central bank commitment can
be seen that there are fewer volatilities in CPI inflation and the output gap.
To contrast with the approximating equilibrium and rational expectations model in
Figure (3.5), when the preference for robustness is introduced into the model with two in-
struments, the central bank fears that the economy would fluctuate more by corresponding
to the shocks as well as to the policy feedback. For the technology shock, the movements
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are manifested compared to the rational expectations outcomes. The central bank is con-
cerned by much larger movements in the output gap, inflation and consumption by then
respond a more aggressive shift in the interest rate. The monetary policy is more ex-
pansionary and persistent after it observes the decline in CPI inflation and growth in the
output gap. Notably, the largest volatility occurs in credit growth and the lending rate
after the robust control method is applied, corresponding to the concern about volatile
housing price.
In comparison with the previous rational expectation case without macroprudential
policy, there are some significant points to note. First, with the macroprudential policy
instrument, the nominal debt growth, lending rate and housing price inflation are more
volatile than before under the circumstance without macroprudential policy. This makes
sense as the variables can have direct impacts on the new instruments. Second, the model,
within the macroprudential policy, mitigates the volatility of CPI inflation and the output
gap. Without the macroprudential policy, the CPI inflation is shift around the region
between -0.04 to 0.18, and the output gap moves between 0.18 to 0.6. However, with
macroprudential policy instrument, the CPI inflation shifts between -0.03 to 0, the output
gap moves between 0 and 0.51. Therefore, the macroprudential policy instrument with
monetary policy together could stabilize the output gap and CPI inflation under technol-
ogy shock. Finally, the robust control method generates more volatility in credit growth
and housing price inflation with macroprudential policy. However, the interest rate shifts
less than before. The results imply that the monetary policy takes fewer actions when it
observes the macroprudential policy generates larger impacts on the economy.
For the worst-case scenario, the results are similar as before: the worst-case shows
more volatile movements than the approximating equilibrium. The largest impacts are
on consumption, output, investment, and the output gap. The central bank is concerned




With housing demand shock, higher housing price comes with higher residential invest-
ment, output and credit growth. The durable goods consumption increases as borrowers
are more willing to invest in the housing market with higher collateral constraint. How-
ever, nondurable goods decline more than durable goods consumption, generating an over-
all drop in total consumption. The impacts on CPI inflation and interest rate are trivial
and close to zero. On the other hand, after the housing demand shock, the robust central
bank has a larger movement in the interest rate by shifting it to the opposite direction.
However, the magnitude of the movement is actually trivial compared to the technology
shock. Moreover, the influences on CPI inflation are also insignificant. This is probably
since the effects of macroprudential policy eased the most shock under changes in the
demand for housing. Contrast with the case of rational expectation; the approximating
equilibrium generates slightly more volatile results. The monetary policy also corresponds
with larger impacts under the technology shock.
Furthermore, it is noticeable to find out that all variables have similar movements
between the outcomes of approximating equilibrium and the worst-case equilibrium. The
greatest difference is made from consumption, output and output gap. As before, the
worst-case model is more volatile than the approximating equilibrium. Under both cir-
cumstances, inflation is more stable than the output gap.
In addition, compared to the KRS model with Taylor rule, our model is assumed to
commit with optimal policy. The advantages of commitment are manifest to be shown
through the graphs. Under housing demand shock, the CPI inflation under commitment
moves a similar pattern with the Taylor rule plus macroprudential policy instrument.
However, the output gap is much more stable. The monetary policy is less expansionary
than in the Taylor rule-based model, regarding the reaction with macroprudential policy.
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3.4.5 Comparing Results with Others
After the demonstration of robust control method over different policy regimes, it is now
fundamental to evaluate the differences between this paper and the others. Some impli-
cations can be drawn through the comparisons with the KRS and others.
First, the robust control method has limited impacts on the macroprudential policy
under financial shocks. When the robust KRS model is applied without macropruden-
tial policy, (Figure (3.3)), most variables show volatilities under three shocks. However,
when the exogenous macroprudential policy is added into the robust monetary policy, the
shocks under both housing demand shocks and financial shocks are stabilized. When the
policymaker implements the endogenous macroprudential policy, the macroprudential pol-
icy instrument even shows more powerful effects to stabilize all variables under financial
shocks. This result confirms the outcomes in the KRS model, which indicates that macro-
prudential policy allows more macroeconomic stabilization. As in the ranking of optimal
policy rules, augmented Taylor rule with macroprudential instrument shows strong prefer-
ences when the policymaker is even aggressive (both ‘hawk’ and ‘super hawk’). Our result
further indicates that macroprudential policy is a powerful tool even under the robust
control model.
Second, the central bank fears the uncertainties of model misspecification; the pol-
icy responses are more aggressive under the endogenous macroprudential policy regime
with monetary policy. There appear to be more volatilities for variables under technol-
ogy shocks, and housing demand shocks when the macroprudential policy is endogenous.
(Figure 3.4 & 3.5) This result seems reasonable, to some extent, that the endogenous
macroprudential policy (two policy instruments) has increased more uncertainties than
the exogenous macroprudential policy (τ = 0.3) (one policy instrument). Policymakers
now face policy-making under both monetary and macroprudential policies. The uncer-
tainty could be reduced if policymakers can identify the sources of shocks. This is also
consistent with the KRS outcome. If the shocks originate from the financial market, both
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monetary and macroprudential policy can be applied to stabilize the CPI inflation. If
shocks come from the housing demand side, then monetary policy rule alone (Figure 3.3)
can stabilize the CPI inflation. It is illustrated that the worst-case scenario generates most
volatilities under housing demand shocks.
Third, the optimal policy ranking has something familiar with technology shocks as
well. The policymakers prefer the robust model without a macroprudential instrument to
stabilize the CPI inflation, (3.3) as the robust monetary policy shows the most aggressive
response. This is also consistent with the KRS result, which implies that the policymakers
prefer the augmented Taylor rule regime the most.
3.5 Conclusion
The research on the macroprudential policy has been popular after the financial crisis; how-
ever, policymakers still confront model misspecification and policy-making issues. There
has also been abundant of literature digging out a robust control method on various DSGE
models. However, the research of robust control methods applies to macroprudential pol-
icy has been limited. Bahaj et al. (2017) uses the Brinard approach to the macroprudential
policy. In comparison, we use the robust control method to the KRS model, where the
primary mechanism is more about the collateral constraint channel. Besides, the exten-
sion allows us to explore the uncertainty of the model when specification errors might
be founded with macroprudential policy studies. This brings more advantages than the
Taylor rule as they show more stable outcomes.
There are some exciting outcomes through the comparisons between a robust monetary
policy with and without macroprudential policy instrument. First, the robust model can
offset financial shocks completely when policymakers implement the endogenous macro-
prudential policy. This suggests the importance of macroprudential policy instrument if
the policymaker can identify the source of financial shock. Second, policymakers are more
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aggressive when they apply both monetary and macroprudential instruments under the
robust control model. Generally, under the approximating equilibrium, the robust central
bank applies the policy more aggressively than in the case of the rational expectation since
it fears that the response to the shocks is more persistent. Under the worst-case equilib-
rium, the impulse response functions illustrate more volatile results than the approximat-
ing equilibrium. Third, the robust monetary policy under technology shock contributes
most on stabilizing the output gap and CPI inflation. This implies that the robust con-
trol method generates most impacts under technology shocks. All these results are also
consistent with the KRS outcomes where macroprudential policy instrument is significant
under financial shocks.
We can conclude that a robust control method is a helpful tool for the central bank;
it helps to inform policy decisions in the face of uncertainty when macroprudential policy
instrument is included with monetary policy. My robust control method outcome further
confirms the importance of macroprudential policy instrument even under the worst-case
scenario. Besides, by identifying the source of disturbances are also helpful for policymak-
ers to deal with uncertainties under the robust control model. Finally, as Bahaj et al.
(2017) suggested, increasing transparency of policy decisions to the public can also reduce
uncertainties. This paper has applied the calibrated model with macroprudential policy




3.6 The KRS Model
Savers’ optimal decisions
For households, there is a fraction λ of households are savers and 1− λ of the remaining
households are borrowers. In equilibrium, the savers would lend to borrowers. For savers,











where β is the discount factor, Cjt provides the consumption of nondurable goods, D
j
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shows the consumption of durable goods, and Ljt denotes individual j’s total working

























is the relative price of durables in terms of nondurables. ε denotes
the external habit stock parameter, which measures the influence of past aggregate non-
durable consumption ct−1. ct shows consumption of nondurable goods, it gives residential
investment, η denotes adjustment costs to residential investment. ξDt shows the housing
demand shock, and dt denotes consumption of durable goods, δ denotes the depreciation
rate.
The savers’ inter-temporal optimization problem generates to the consumption of non-
durable goods Euler equation,
ε∆ct = Et∆ct+1 − (1− ε)(rt − Et∆pct+1) (3.31)
Equations (3.32) and (3.33) imply the optimal labour supply conditions to nondurable
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and durable sectors, respectively.
ct − εct−1
1− ε
+ [(ψ − lL)α+ lL]lCt + (ψ − lL)(1− α)lDt = wCt (3.32)
ct − εct−1
1− ε
+ [(ψ − lL)(1− α) + lL]lDt + (ψ − lL)αlCt = wDt (3.33)
where ψ denotes inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, lL denotes labour disutility
of switching sectors, lCt and l
D
t denote labour supply in nondurable and durable sectors,
respectively. wCt and w
D
t show the real wages in each sector.
Borrowers’ optimal decisions
It is assumed that borrowers share similar conditions as the savers. All variables with



















= BBbBt + αWL
B(wCt + l
C,B




where bBt denotes the real value of credit in nondurable consumption units. Borrowers
consume nondurables and invest in the housing stock, and supply labour to both sectors.





+ η(iBt − iBt−1) = µBt + βBη(EtiBt+1 − iBt ) (3.36)
[1− βB(1− δ)](ξDt − dBt ) = µBt − β(1− δ)EtµBt+1 (3.37)
ε∆cBt = Et∆c
B

















One main distinction is that savers invest to achieve deposit rate rt and borrowers obtain
loans from financial intermediaries at a lending rate of rLt .
Financial Intermediaries









Equation (3.14) is the most fundamental element of the model. The spread between the
lending and the deposit rates is affected by a financial shock (vt), an increasing function
of the leverage of borrowers (F ) and a macroprudential instrument (τt). The equation
describes the behaviour of the lending rate. It not only shows the determination of the
spread between the policy rate and the lending rate but also indicates where the macro-
prudential instrument enters into the model.
In this paper, we discuss two forms of functions of macroprudential rules. On one
hand, as presumed in the KRS model, the macroprudential rule implies the reaction of a





When equation (3.42) is substituted into (3.41), the log-linearized steady-state form is
derived:
rLt = rt + κ(b
B
t − dBt − qt)− vt + τ(bBt−1 − bBt−2 + ∆pCt−1) (3.43)
When τ = 0, this means that macroprudential policy instrument is not operational. Under
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this scenario, the spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate is just positively
related to endogenous component depending on the LTV ratio for borrowers and is nega-
tively related to a financial shock. When τ is positive, it increases the costs of the lending
proportional to nominal credit growth. However, when macroprudential instrument be-
comes an endogenous variable, the equation is shown as follows,
rLt = rt + κ(b
B
t − dBt − qt) + vt + τ̂t (3.44)
Since the macroprudential instrument influences the lending rates, central bank could
change the regulations for different levels of capital requirements as asset prices fluctuate,
to some extent, which offsets volatility in collateral values and financial shocks.
The relative housing price evolves as given,












Equation (3.46) and (3.47) show the production functions. The equations imply that in-
termediate goods in both sectors are produced using only labour. The production function
in the nondurable sector is affected by a technology shock.
CPI equations
∆pCt − ψC∆pCt−1 = βEt(∆pCt+1 − ψC∆pCt ) + κC(wCt − aCt ) (3.48)
∆pDt − ψD∆pDt−1 = βEt(∆pDt+1 − ψD∆pDt ) + κD(wDt − qt) (3.49)
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where κC = (1−θC)(1−βθC)θC and κ
D = (1−θD)(1−βθD)θD .
Equations 3.48 and 3.49 describe both sectors’ pricing decisions. Firms’ CPI price decisions
are distinct, not only as various Calvo parameters are applied but also since that technology
shocks enter into the non-durable sector only.
Market clearing conditions
The market-clearing conditions are given according to aggregate quantities. In the non-
durable sector, total production is equal to total consumption that includes savers and
borrowers. In the durable sector, total production equals aggregate residential investment.
Aggregate real GDP gives the combined output of the durable and non-durable sectors.
The equations are given by:
yCt =
λCct + (1− λ)CBcBt
λC + (1− λ)CB
(3.50)
yDt =
λδDit + (1− λ)δDBiBt




t + (1− α)yDt (3.52)
The law of motion of two types of housing stocks for savers and borrowers are provided
by,
dt = (1− δ)dt−1 + δit (3.53)
dBt = (1− δ)dBt−1 + δiBt (3.54)
Total hours worked equal labour supply in each sector:
lC,tott =














All shocks follow AR(1) process, the shocks featured are technology shock, housing demand











vt = ρvvt−1 + ε
v
t (3.59)
3.7 The Linearized Model Equations
The appendix summarizes all the log-linearized equations that has been implemented in




+ η(it − it−1) = µt + βη(Etit+1 − it) (3.60)
[1− β(1− δ)](ξDt − dt) = µt − β(1− δ)Etµt+1 (3.61)
ε∆ct = Et∆ct+1 − (1− ε)(rt − Et∆pct+1) (3.62)
ct − εct−1
1− ε
+ [(ψ − lL)α+ lL]lCt + (ψ − lL)(1− α)lDt = wCt (3.63)
ct − εct−1
1− ε
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+ η(iBt − iBt−1) = µBt + βBη(EtiBt+1 − iBt ) (3.66)
[1− βB(1− δ)](ξDt − dBt ) = µBt − β(1− δ)EtµBt+1 (3.67)
ε∆cBt = Et∆c
B
t+1 − (1− ε)(rLt − Et∆pct+1) (3.68)
cBt − εcBt−1
1− ε














rLt = rt + κ(b
B
t − dBt − qt)− vt + τ(bBt−1 − bBt−2 + ∆pCt−1) (3.71)
∆pt = γ∆p
C
t + (1− γ)∆pDt (3.72)











∆pCt − ψC∆pCt−1 = βEt(∆pCt+1 − ψC∆pCt ) + κC(wCt − aCt ) (3.76)
∆pDt − ψD∆pDt−1 = βEt(∆pDt+1 − ψD∆pDt ) + κD(wDt − qt) (3.77)
yCt =
λCct + (1− λ)CBcBt
λC + (1− λ)CB
(3.78)
yDt =
λδDit + (1− λ)δDBiBt




t + (1− α)yDt (3.80)
dt = (1− δ)dt−1 + δit (3.81)
dBt = (1− δ)dBt−1 + δiBt (3.82)
lC,tott =


























Figure 3.2: Impulse responses for the non-robust model with vs without macropru-
dential policy under commitment
Notes: This figure shows impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation shocks in the non-robust
policy model with or without the macroprudential policy under commitment. The continuous solid lines
that subscripted with ‘n’ mean the non-robust model without macroprudential policy; the dashed lines that
subscripted with ‘m’ mean the non-robust model with macroprudential policy; πt denotes CPI inflation;
xt denotes the output gap; rt denotes the policy rate; ∆
d






Figure 3.3: Impulse responses for the robust model without macroprudential policy
under commitment
Notes: This figure shows that the impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation shocks in the robust
policy model without macroprudential policy, when the model is set with commitment. The dashed lines
that subscripted with ‘re’ mean the outcome with rational expectations with non-robust monetary policy;
the continuous solid lines that subscripted with ‘a’ indicate the outcome in the approximating equilibrium
with robust monetary policy; the dash dot lines that subscripted with ‘w’ represent the outcome with the
worst-case equilibrium in robust monetary policy. πt denotes CPI inflation; xt denotes the output gap; rt
denotes the policy rate; ∆dt shows the nominal debt growth; r
L
t shows the lending rate.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses for the robust model with exogenous macroprudential policy
under commitment τ̂t = 0.3
Notes: This figure shows the impulse responses of main variables to three shocks with approximating
model, the worst-case equilibrium and rational expectations. The dashed lines that subscripted with ‘re’
mean the outcome with rational expectations with non-robust monetary policy; the continuous solid lines
that subscripted with ‘a‘ indicate the outcome in the approximating equilibrium with robust monetary
policy; the dash dot lines that subscripted with ‘w’ represent the outcome with the worst-case equilibrium
in robust monetary policy.πt denotes CPI inflation; xt denotes the output gap; rt denotes the policy rate;
∆dt shows the nominal debt growth; r
L
t shows the lending rate.
101
Chapter 3
Figure 3.5: Impulse responses for the robust model with endogenous macroprudential
policy under commitment
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses with rational expectations and the approximating model.
The dashed lines that subscripted with ‘re’ mean the outcome with rational expectations with non-robust
monetary policy; the continuous solid lines that subscripted with ‘a’ indicate the outcome in the approxi-
mating equilibrium with robust monetary policy; the dash dot lines that subscripted with ‘w’ represent the
outcome with the worst-case equilibrium in robust monetary policy.πt denotes CPI inflation; xt denotes
the output gap; rt denotes the policy rate; ∆
d
t shows the nominal debt growth; r
L
t shows the lending rate.
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The seminal contributions by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)
highlighted the importance of reputation and credibility for monetary policymakers. A
key insight from the literature these works spawned is that there are substantial macroeco-
nomic gains in formulating policy by committing to a policy rule. In the original literature
the lack of commitment reflected itself in an inflationary bias, where average inflation is
above its desired value. The New Keynesian literature with more dynamic features, such
as Clarida et al. (1999) the absence of commitment results not in an inflation bias but in a
stabilisation bias, which occurs even in the absence of the inflation bias. In these instances
the macroeconomic losses that arise occur due to the discretionary policymaker stabilising
inflation relatively too little compared to the output gap. Much of the literature in this
area has aimed to quantify the losses from lack of commitment (McAdam et al. (2007)) as
well as in the design of central banks, through institutional arrangements, that replicate
commitment Paez-Farrell (2012).
Nonetheless, the analysis comparing commitment to discretion has typically relied on
New Keynesian models that ignore financial frictions. Therefore, this chapter is interested
in obtaining the welfare differential of the unconventional monetary policy model under
commitment and discretion. There are three shocks in the model: technology shock, capi-
tal quality shock, and net worth shock. Moreover, to analyse the crucial function of credit
intervention, we compare three types of models, which are financial accelerator plus credit
policy, financial frictions model, and the DSGE model without credit intervention. There
are some notable results worth mentioning. First, the loss under commitment is always
smaller than the loss under discretion for all types of models. Second, welfare gain from
commitment varies as the financial sector parameters differ. Central banks commit to
keeping low credit intervention intensities for highest welfare gains under commitment,
while they also have incentives to deviate to intervene more to achieve more stable con-
sumption. Third, credit policy plays a fundamental role in changing leverage-ratio and




Our research is similar to Dennis and Söderström (2006) (hereafter, DS), in calculating
the welfare losses that arise from discretion we use the approach by the DS paper. The
remainder of this paper consists of four sections. The first section shows the GK model
under commitment and the comparisons to the GK results. Section 2 describes the other
part demonstrates the GK model under discretion case and the comparisons with the two,
the last part would conclude the analysis.
4.2 Literature Review
Research interests relating to unconventional monetary policy studies have mostly been
in the area of its impacts on different areas, the different channels, and incorporating var-
ious financial frictions in a DSGE model. However, there is sparse research correlated to
the optimal unconventional monetary policy under commitment and discretion scenarios.
For conducting optimal policy under commitment and discretion, the most closely related
papers are Woodford and Cúrdia (2008), Carlstrom et al. (2010), Brendon et al. (2011),
and Fiore and Tristani (2012). However, we will focus on the optimal unconventional
monetary policy based on the GK model. In this section, we will first review the crucial
concept of unconventional monetary policy, and later find the related literature concerning
the important role of commitment in unconventional monetary policy. At last, we find the
related research on how to quantify the commitment under the monetary policy.
4.2.1 Understanding Unconventional Monetary Policy
In normal times, the conventional monetary policy indicates that central banks steer of-
ficial interest rates. Policymakers make decisions and announcements, which are then
transmitted to the interbank market. However, during the financial crisis in 2007, the
transmission mechanism was severely disrupted due to the following reasons. First, the
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channel from official interest rates to money market rates was severely affected due to
the volatility of demand for reserves and the limited redistribution of reserves. Second,
interruptions in other segments of the financial market, such as asset prices, bank rates, ex-
change rate and money credit may also hinder the transmission channels. Third, the zero
lower bound of official interest rates may be binding for central banks’ monetary policy
decisions. (Cecioni et al. (2011)) Therefore, unconventional monetary policy was carried
out by most countries to limit the damage in case of the financial crisis to occur. Instead of
affecting the economy through financial intermediaries, central banks can implement some
policies directly to alter the financial market situations. Most existing literature classifies
three powerful tools for unconventional monetary policy: directly injected liquidity to dys-
functional markets (credit easing); or implement purchased long-term government bonds
and mortgage-backed securities to reduce credit cost, increase asset prices and inject more
energy into the economy (quantitative easing); or provide communication about future
interest rates (forward guidance).
According to Cecioni et al. (2011), unconventional monetary policy can be theoretically
classified into two channels of transmission. One is the signalling channel, implying that
central banks communicate and inform the public about its future evolution of short-term
interest rates, the purchase of financial assets and the implementation of other policies to
save the dysfunctional market. The signalling channel depends on whether central banks
can provide credibility to keep low-interest rates and the extent to which private expecta-
tions and confidence influence macroeconomic and financial market conditions. Therefore,
it is necessary to analyse the optimal unconventional monetary policy under commitment
and discretion scenarios.
For the signalling channel, there are different views of the research.Krugman et al.
(1998) suggests one “irresponsibility principle”. In his study, to escape from the zero
lower bound, central banks should convince the market that they would allow prices to
grow so to increase inflationary expectations. As he mentioned that central banks might
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confront the credibility crisis if they cannot overcome the liquidity trap through mone-
tary policy. Moreover, Eggertsson et al. (2003) evaluates a simple optimised model of the
monetary transmission mechanism; they summarise that the signalling channel seems to
be the only effective channel to save the liquidity trap. They also indicate that optimal
monetary policy is possible under credible commitment. Furthermore, Woodford (2012)
argues that central banks should commit to a target criterion that is used to determine
an appropriate timing to inform the changes in interest rates. He claimed that the most
effective form of forwarding guidance relies on whether central banks can provide an ad-
vanced commitment to definite criteria for future policy decisions.
The second channel is the portfolio-balance channel, which implies the purchase of
securities and supports credit flows. In this channel, central banks implement different
tools to affect both the private sector and central banks’ balance sheet. Central banks
can make operations such as the large-scale purchase of securities, asset swaps and direct
liquidity injections. There are a large number of papers which examine unconventional
monetary policy through this channel. Vayanos and Vila (2009) built a formal preferred-
habitat model for the interest rate tern structure. Changing the supply of the asset of a
given maturity can affect the yields of the assets when investors have specific preferences
over maturities. Besides, many others have applied such preferred-habitat preferences into
DSGE models. Chen et al. (2012) investigated a calibrated DSGE model to assess the
effects of Large Scale of Asset Purchases (LSAPs). Their result suggests that the portfolio
balance channel has less powerful effects than the signalling channel on the macroecon-
omy. Other groups of researchers derive unconventional monetary policy models from the
agent issue between households and financial intermediaries, such as Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010),Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2018). Those models all apply
financial intermediation frictions and heterogeneous private sectors through the financial
accelerator mechanism. Gertler and Karadi (2018) investigated the critical role of LSAPs




Besides, Quint and Tristani (2018) provide a quantitative assessment of the central
bank’s liquidity provision effect on macroeconomic variables. They first investigate the
connection between the interbank market intentions and the economic recession in a struc-
tural VAR model to obtain theoretical restrictions. Then they apply the Smets and
Wouters (2003) DSGE model with main characteristics from the Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) model to capture the transmission mechanism of liquidity shocks to the macroe-
conomy. After the investigation, they find that structural liquidity shocks originate in
the interbank market and lead to an increasing in bank lending spreads and a decrease in
private investment. The results also further confirm the benefits of the central bank’s liq-
uidity provisions effects. However, Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) argued that the signalling
channel accounts for 30-65% of the total impact under the unconventional monetary policy.
They suggested that bond investors could change their expectations of long-term interest
rates if the large-scale purchase of QE signal to market participants that central banks
have changed their views over the economic outlook or policy preference.
4.2.2 Commitment under Unconventional Monetary Policy
Since the 1970s, Kydland and Prescott (1977) indicate the essential role of rational ex-
pectations for policymakers. The enormous amount of research has recommended that
commitment to a policy rule can make the monetary policy optimal. However, such pol-
icy rule is time-inconsistent, and a time-consistent policy was suggested as a suboptimal
policy. Later, Barro and Gordon (1983) show that time-consistent policy could generate
high inflation, known as inflation bias. Under discretion, the inflation bias could occur
for two reasons. One is that the central bank has an incentive to inflate once the private
sector’s expectations are settled. The other is that the central bank could not pre-commit
to a zero average inflation rate. Although challenging, it is fundamental for policymakers
to commit to obtain an optimal monetary policy. In this paper, we mainly concentrate on
the importance of commitment under the unconventional monetary policy.
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As the previous section has mentioned, for the forward guidance to be efficient, com-
mitment to the low-interest rates is crucial for central banks. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018)
study unconventional monetary policies in the UK, Japan and the Euro area, they suggest
that unconventional monetary policy could be more effective if the central bank is credibly
committed to providing sustained monetary accommodation. The example implies that
the Bank of Japan’s commitment to delivering sustain inflation between 2010 and 2012 has
been undermined by long-term deflation. Moreover, Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) extend
the New Keynesian model allowing variations of the central bank’s balance sheet and the
interest rate paid on reserves. The research studies the model with zero lower bond issue
and suggests that commitment is crucial to maintain policy accommodation in mitigating
the binding effects. The best method to formulate this commitment is to identify with
certainty in advance in terms of targets must be met.
There have been several studies which attempt to quantify the welfare of commitment
under various models. Those papers choose either to quantify inflation bias or stabilisation
bias. McCallum and Nelson (2000) review the differences between the timeless perspec-
tive and discretionary models to confirm the vital feature of forward-looking expectations.
They calculated the welfare loss through various values of inflation and output gap volatil-
ity. The outcome implies that the welfare loss is more significant when the model specifica-
tions show that the inflation rate is persistent and more weight is on output-gap variability.
As McAdam et al. (2007) (LMP) argued, the previous literature has mainly utilised simple
New Keynesian models with the representative consumer’s utility in quadratic approxima-
tion form to compare variances of the output gap and inflation. Those models have some
drawbacks, such as missing consumers and firms’ forward-looking information. McAdam
et al. (2007) applied the Smets and Wouters (2003) model with micro-foundations to
quantify the stabilisation gains from commitment in the light of household welfare. Den-
nis and Söderström (2006) (DS) quantified the welfare gains between commitment and
discretionary monetary policy by applying ”the permanent deviation of inflation from the
109
Chapter 4
target that in welfare terms is equivalent to moving from discretion to precommitment”.
They evaluate social welfare through two measures, ”percentage gain in welfare” and ”in-
flation equivalent”, within three stylised models of optimal discretionary rules and optimal
commitment rules. One result suggests that the monetary policy regime, which focuses on
output stabilisation more than inflation stabilisation and leads to the increasing influence
of precommitment to welfare.
In this chapter, there are some similarities and variations in contrast to Dennis and
Söderström (2006) ’s. First, as the LMP paper argued that many econometric models,
who have missed micro-foundations using a quadratic approximation of the representa-
tive consumer’s utility as welfare loss function, are inappropriate. This is because that
forward-looking behaviour is fundamental for rational expectations so that would affect
policymakers’ decisions. However, the DS considers the representative agent’s discounted
life-time utility as a social welfare loss function. Therefore, we apply the welfare loss func-
tion that is based on the GK model’s utility function. One vital feature of the GK model is
that it demonstrates heterogeneous agents constrain financial intermediaries. Second, this
chapter follows the DS paper by quantifying two welfare differentials between commitment
and discretion. Two methods can provide results for easy comparisons between this work
and others. Third, we quantify the welfare gains from the GK unconventional monetary
policy model; this is the main contribution of this chapter. As previous literature has
focused on either simple New Keynesian models or three-equation models, those models
bring limited impact to practical studies after the financial crisis.
4.3 The Unconventional Monetary Policy Model
The GK model is closely related to conventional monetary policy models with financial
accelerators. Financial intermediaries might be subject to endogenously determining bal-
ance sheet constraints, and the central bank can lend directly to private credit markets.
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There are some pioneering contributions of the GK model, which have become one fun-
damental literature in unconventional DSGE models. First, the GK model provides a
quantitative unconventional DSGE model with financial accelerators confronting a bal-
ance sheet constraint. Second, the GK model quantified the effects of the financial crisis
and explained the impacts of credit policy on the economy. Third, the GK model also
considers the zero lower bound constraint and suggest that the unconventional monetary
policy effects will mitigate after the financial crisis is over. We will recapture the impor-
tant parts from the GK model in the next section before we quantify the welfare gains of
committed unconventional monetary policy.
4.3.1 Model Analysis
The model follows the conventional monetary DSGE model framework with nominal rigidi-
ties. There is a continuum of identical households with measure unity. Within each house-
hold, there are two types of members: workers and bankers. Workers supply labour, and
each banker manages a financial intermediary. They both give the earnings back to the
households. However, households make deposits in financial intermediaries that they do
not own. There exists perfect consumption insurance in the family. At any point, there
exists a fraction of household 1 − f who are workers, and the remainder f , are bankers.
The two types of workers can also switch over time. Therefore, it is supposed that (1−θ)f
of bankers exit and become workers in every period. The relative portion of each type
is fixed because a similar size of workers can randomly become bankers. The households








where the discount factor 0 < β < 1, habit parameter 0 < h < 1, ψ and χ are both
positive. The budget constraint is given by
Ct = wtLt + Πt + Tt +RtBt −Bt+1 (4.2)
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where wt is the real wage, Πt is the net payouts to the household from both ownership, Tt
gives the lump-sum taxes, Bt+1 shows the total quantity of short term debt the household
acquires, Rt is the gross real return of one period real bonds from time t-1 to t.
Financial intermediaries lend money obtained from households to firms. The balance sheet
of a financial intermediary is given by
QtSjt = Njt +Bjt+1 (4.3)
where Njt shows the amount of the wealth or net worth at the end of period t; Bjt+1
gives the deposits that intermediaries obtain from households can also be thought as the
intermediaries’ debt; Sjt shows the number of financial claims on non-financial firms; Qt
is the relative price of each claim. Therefore, the amount that intermediaries can lend is
equal to the number of their equities and the deposits from households.
Banker’s equity capital evolves
Njt+1 = Rkt+1QtSjt −Rt+1Bjt+1 = (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSjt +Rt+1Njt (4.4)
where Rt is the gross real return on intermediary deposits and government debt from
period t-1 to t, Rkt+1 is the stochastic return on intermediary assets over period t+1.
The difference between banker’s equity and the riskless return depends on the premium
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1) and his total quantity of assets QtSjt.
The agency problem limits the intermediaries’ ability to borrow. It is assumed that the
banker can divert λ fraction of available funds and the depositors can force intermediaries
into bankruptcy and recover the remaining fraction (1 − λ) of assets. The total demand
for assets is given by,
QtSt = φtNt (4.5)
where φt =
ηt
λ−vt is the leverage ratio that is equal to the ratio of intermediate assets to
equity. vt is interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the banker of expand-
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ing assets one more unit QtSt by holding Njt constant. The variable ηt is explained as the
expected discounted value of increasing one more unit of Njt by holding QtSjt constant.
St provides the aggregate quantity of intermediary assets, Nt shows the aggregate inter-
mediary capital stock. Therefore, the variation in total assets demand (QtSt) is influenced
by the leverage ratio (φt) and total capital stock (Nt).
When the central bank is willing to fund a fraction ψ of intermediated assets, total
value of intermediated assets is given by,
QtSt = φtNt + ψtQtSt = φctNt (4.6)
where φct =
1
1−ψφt is the leverage ratio total intermediated funds and depends positively
on the intensity of credit policy ψt.
In normal times, the central bank is assumed to follow a Taylor rule with interest-rate
persistence, which is given by
it = (1− ρ)[i+ κππt + κy(logYt − logY ∗t )] + ρit−1 + εt (4.7)
where it is the nominal interest rate, which is the instrument of monetary policy in nor-
mal times. The interest rate smoothing parameter ρ belongs zero to one, κπ denotes the
inflation coefficient of the Taylor rule, κy shows the output gap coefficient of the Taylor
rule. During the 2007-8 financial crisis, the monetary policy also involves credit interven-
tion. The central bank injects credit into the market in response to movements in credit
spreads, in terms of the feedback rule,
ψt = ψ + vEt[(logRkt+1 − logRt+1)− (logRk − logR)] (4.8)
logRk− logR is the steady-state premium,v is the credit policy feedback parameter. When
the crisis happens, the central bank expands credit as the interest rate premium increase
relative to its steady-state value.
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The second-order form of the whole model equations is in the Appendix. All the vari-
ables are solved in the exponential form in the second-order approximation. According
to the GK model, we classify the welfare results into three scenarios with the different
equations:
(1) The financial accelerator model with credit policy intervention (FACP ). This model
includes all 42 equations.
(2) The financial accelerator model without credit policy (FA) model. This model will
omit equations (4.43), (4.47) and (4.53). Those equations show the credit policy interven-
tion.
4.3.2 Calibration
Table (4.1) provides the calibrated parameters cited from the GK model. As the GK
model mentions that there are fifteen conventional parameters and three particular pa-
rameters in the model. Most of the values come from the estimates in Primiceri et al.
(2006), who applied the Bayesian method to US data. Their model results show compet-
itive to the others’ research, such as Smets and Wouters (2003). The cited values include
the proportionate habit parameter, the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to
the utilisation rate, the relative utility weight on labour, price indexing and price rigidity
parameters, the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, and the inverse elasticity of the net
investment to the price of capital. Other parameters are used in common values, such as
the discount rate, the depreciation rate, the capital share, the elasticity of substitution
between goods, and the steady-state government expenditures share.
The specific parameters in the GK model are the divertable fraction of capital assets
(λ = 0.381), the proportional transfer to the entering bankers (ω = 0.002), and the
survival rate of the bankers (θ = 0.972). Those parameters were achieved to meet the
targets that include a one hundred basis point of a steady-state interest rate spread, a
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Table 4.1: Calibrated Parameters
β 0.990 Discount rate
σ 1.000 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
h 0.815 Habit parameter
χ 3.409 Relative utility weight of labour
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ζ 7.2 Elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to utilization rate
λ 0.381 Starting value divertable fraction of capital assets
ω 0.002 Proportional transfer to the entering bankers
θ 0.972 Survival rate of the bankers
α 0.330 Capital share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ηi 1.728 Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital
ε 4.167 Elasticity of substitution
γ 0.779 Probability of keeping the price constant
γP 0.241 Price indexation parameter
G
Y 0.200 Steady state proportion of government expenditures
ρi 0.000 Interest rate smoothing parameter (under FA and FACP model)
ρi 0.8 Interest rate smoothing parameter (under DSGE model)
κπ 1.500 Inflation coefficient in the Taylor rule
κy 0.125 Output gap coefficient in the Taylor rule
σξ 0.05 Size of the capital quality shock
ρξ 0.66 Persistence of the capital quality shock
σa 0.01 Size of the TFP shock
ρa 0.95 Persistence of the TFP shock
σg 0.01 Size of the government expenditure shock
ρg 0.95 Persistence of the government expenditure shock
σNe 0.01 Volatility to the wealth shock
σi 0.01 Volatility to the Taylor rule shock
ρεψ 0.66 Persistence of the CP shock
σψ 0.072 Size of the CP shock
Note: The calibrated parameters are cited from the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model
115
Chapter 4
steady-state leverage ratio of four and an average horizon of a decade for bankers. In
terms of calibration, the model assumes that the banker can choose to divert 38.1 per cent
of available funds at the beginning period and transfer them back to the household. The
banker’s cost is that depositors can force the intermediary to recover the rest of 61.9 per
cent of assets. In every period, 97.2 per cent of bankers can survive to be bankers in the
next period. However, 2.8f per cent of bankers would have to exit and become workers.
f is the fraction of bankers. Therefore, the household transfers the fraction ω1−θ = 71.4
per cent of total final period assets to the entering bankers each period.
4.3.3 Welfare Analysis Approach
This chapter follows the welfare analysis approach used by Dennis and Söderström (2006),
while the difference is that we are using the non-linear model with a recursive utility
function. The utility function is given by
Ωt = U(Ct, Lt) + βEtΩt+1 (4.9)
where β is the discount factor. As McAdam et al. (2007) argue that many studies apply
simple New Keynesian models with the standard ad hoc loss functions without micro-
foundations. These loss functions either include the standard deviation of the output gap
and inflation, or the variances of the output gap: output and inflation. Even though the
quadratic approximation of the representative consumer’s utility function coincides with
the ad hoc loss functions, those models, including forward-looking behaviour, are inap-
propriate as the important sources of time-inconsistency are missing. Therefore, we apply
the welfare approach based on the unconventional monetary policy model with a hetero-
geneous agent and financial intermediaries. The welfare-based utility function is solved by
a second-order approximation about the steady-state first. Then we take a second-order
approximation of the whole model for the steady-state and apply this approximation as
the objective function to the predetermined variables and shocks of the system.
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To obtain the optimal policy rules under commitment and discretion, we use two differ-
ent methods from Dynare. For the commitment case, we use the Dynare Ramsey approach
to calculate the first-order conditions of the Ramsey planner’ objective function subject to
the non-linear constraints that are the first-order conditions of the private economy. Then
we take approximates of the first-order conditions of the planner’s objective function to
first order. The central bank commits to the interest rate as the instrument to obtain the
optimal commitment policy. On the other hand, the discretionary case is more compli-
cated. In the linear quadratic loss function format model, the approximation of optimal
policy under discretion can be solved by LQ solver algorithm, which is described by Dennis
(2007). However, the unconventional model we apply here is non-linear; the conventional
discretionary method is not applicable here. Therefore, we choose the Covariance Ma-
trix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMAES) to solve the second-order approximation
problem for the discretionary case. The CMAES is a second-order method estimating a
positive definite matrix within a covariance matrix procedure. This method takes advan-
tages of being feasible on non-separable and conditioned problems. It has been proved
to be a reliable and highly competitive algorithm for both local optimisation and global
optimisation. (Hansen et al. (2003) and Ros and Hansen (2008)). Therefore, the CMAES
can calculate the optimal parameter of κy and κπ with corresponding welfare loss in terms
of different policy rules.
There are two alternative measures that can be applied to analyse the differences
between commitment and discretionary monetary policy. One is the percentage gain
in welfare-related with moving from the discretionary monetary policy to commitment
scenario:
Ω = 100 ∗ [1− LC
LD
] (4.10)
where LC and LD are the social loss function under commitment and discretion, respec-
tively. Equation (4.10) captures the welfare gains over commitment under the discretionary
case. In this equation, LC shows the welfare outcome when the central bank can commit
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to the optimal interest rate rule; LD demonstrates the scenario when the central bank
deviates from its promise and attempts to optimise the policy rule in the time-consistent
equilibrium.
The welfare results vary under different policy rule settings. First, for the FACP model,
the central bank must commit to the low-interest rate with credit intervention without
interest rate smoothing (ρi = 0) to respond to the capital quality shock for a single crisis
period. However, as the GK model mentioned that this not an on-going sequence, the cen-
tral bank might discrete from the optimal policy rules once it considers the financial crisis
is over. Second, for the FA model, the central bank commits to the optimal interest rate
rule without credit intervention and interest rate smoothing. This is the situation during
normal times when the central bank implements policy rules to take into account financial
frictions. The central banks might re-optimise the future interest rates by deviating from
original promises. Third, for the DSGE model without financial frictions, the central bank
simply commits to the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing (ρi = 0.8). The welfare loss
LD is achieved when the central bank cannot keep its promise by smoothing interest rates.
The other approach is followed by Jensen (2002) that obtains a permanent deviation of
consumption, in welfare terms is equivalent to moving from the discretion to commitment
scenario. Differentiated with Dennis and Söderström (2006) inflation equivalent, we are
using the “consumption equivalent” term as the recursive utility function is applied. The
“consumption equivalent” is given by
ĈE =
√
LD − LCF (4.11)




Table 4.2: Welfare Gain from Commit in FACP Model (Benchmark Case)











1.099 0.0435 296.6207 452.8033 34.4924 12.4973
NOTES: This table shows the optimal interest rate rule parameters (κpi and
κy), the value of the central bank loss under commitment (LC) and discre-
tion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment (Ω) and the consumption
equivalent (ĈE).
.
4.4 Unconventional Monetary Policy with Credit Interven-
tion (FACP Model)
This section presents results for the optimal welfare analysis under the financial accelerator
model with credit intervention. Table (4.2) provides the results from optimal welfare out-
comes under commitment and discretion with optimized parameter κπ and κy. According
to the Matlab CMAES optimiser, optimal parameters suggested were 1.099 for inflation
coefficient and 0.0435 for the output gap coefficient. The optimal parameters are slightly
lower than the calibrated value in the GK model, which applies 1.5 for inflation and 0.125
for the output gap. For the calibrated parameters v = 10, λ = 0.381, θ = 0.9715, the
welfare loss is 296.6207 under commitment and 452.8033 under the discretionary monetary
policy. The welfare loss is much smaller under the commitment case than the discretionary
monetary policy. By sticking to the committed policy rule, the central bank can obtain
benefits of approximately 34 per cent. The consumption equivalent is 12.4973.
We will also manipulate some fundamental parameters, while keeping others constant,
to identify the variation in the welfare benefits from commitment and consumption equiv-
alent. Tables (4.3) to (4.5) illustrate the variations of welfare under different levels of
parameters. The first parameter we considered was v in Table (4.3) that shows with the
credit intervention intensities parameter. When v = 10, the situation is close to the real
financial crisis scenario, as suggested in the GK model. v = 100 is seen as an aggressive
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intervention and close to the optimum scenario. The differences between commitment and
discretion are shown from level v=10 to v=100. The loss under commitment is always
lower than under discretion. All results show a decreasing and then increasing pattern
when the central bank intervention intensities expand.
On the one hand, when the central bank follows the committed optimal policy, the
welfare loss declines first and grows later. The lowest loss is obtained when v = 30. The
highest gain from commitment is when v = 10. The most stable consumption level is
obtained when v = 50. On the other hand, under the discretionary monetary policy, there
are no certain sequences when the credit feedback parameters increase. The loss gets
bigger at the beginning, drops and then grows after that. Moreover, the inefficiency of
discretionary policy is equivalent to a permanent deviation of consumption from a target
that is between 10.0937 and 12.5186. In terms of Table (4.3), there are some other inter-
esting phenomena as well. When the central bank is committed to the credit intervention
at level v = 10, it has the incentive to deviate from the current level and intervene more,
because level v = 30 has a lower loss under two scenarios and has more stable consump-
tion. The same applies to the other levels; the central bank always has the incentive to
deviate from the current level of credit intervention. However, the central bank should
choose to stick to at level v = 30 due to lower loss under commitment; this would generate
growth in the central bank’s balance sheet, equal to approximately ten per cent of the
value of the capital stock.
Table (4.4) provides the different specifications of the parameter λ, the fraction of
capital that can be diverted by financial intermediaries. This parameter aims to pin down
the steady-state leverage ratio. As calibrated at 38 per cent of assets the bankers can
divert, the steady-state leverage ratio is low at four. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) recom-
mended that the fraction can be much lower for the leverage ratio to be higher in sectors
that are investing. Therefore, we consider 0.381 as the highest fraction of capital that
can be diverted; the variation levels begin from λ = 0.15. Under commitment, the loss
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10 296.0892 452.8033 34.6098 12.5186
30 296.067 405.7637 27.0346 10.4736
50 296.0699 397.9521 25.6016 10.0937
70 296.0803 398.3557 25.6744 10.1131
100 296.0997 402.8214 26.4936 10.3306
NOTES: This table shows the value of the central bank loss under com-
mitment (LC) and discretion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment
(Ω) and the consumption equivalent (ĈE), for different parameters with
survival rate of bankers (v).
varies from 294.4079 to 296.0892; interestingly, the lowest loss occurs when λ = 0.15. The
gain from commitment varies from 34.6 per cent to 65.5 per cent. The percentage gain
declines as the diverted fraction of capital increases. Under the discretionary case, the loss
decreases as the fraction grows. The same pattern applies to the consumption equivalent.
The most stable consumption occurs when λ = 0.381. The central bank should commit
to the low level of a diverted fraction of capital stock as the losses are all smaller than the
case under discretion, the percentage gain is also high when the fraction is low. However,
the central bank would always want to deviate from the current level as the discretionary
case illustrate a decreasing pattern and consumption equivalent also implies an increasing
stable path.
Table (4.5) shows the results of different levels of survival rate of banker θ. All re-
sults under commitment are smaller than those under discretion, implying that the central
bank is better off by committing the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the
loss drops as θ increases from 0.7 to 0.9715. However, other results do not show a clear
pattern. Under discretion, the loss declines first, increases to a level of 0.9 and then
decreases to the level of 0.9715. The same applies to the percentage gain from commit-
ment and consumption equivalent. The overall results suggest that θ can be chosen at
121
Chapter 4










0.15 293.8769 851.3653 65.4817 23.6112
0.2 294.4079 776.0162 62.0616 21.9456
0.25 294.8995 726.9587 59.4338 20.7860
0.3 295.3655 690.6028 57.2308 19.8806
0.381 296.0892 452.8033 34.6098 12.5186
NOTES: This table shows the value of the central bank loss under commitment (LC)
and discretion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment (Ω) and the consumption
equivalent (ĈE), for different parameters financial intermediaries’ fraction of capital
that can be diverted (λ).









0.7 312.4634 353.7438 11.6696 6.4250
0.8 308.2312 343.1127 10.1662 5.9061
0.85 305.8565 335.2020 8.7546 5.4171
0.9 303.0573 646.3183 53.1102 18.5273
0.9715 296.0892 452.8033 34.6098 12.5186
NOTES: This table shows the value of the central bank loss under commitment
(LC) and discretion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment (Ω) and the




the level of 0.85 that would generate a relative less loss and more stable consumption level.
4.4.1 Impulse Responses
With credit policy, the GK model only shows the impulse response of capital quality
shock. There are four shocks that will be discussed in this section, including technology
shock, shock to capital quality, shock to the net worth, and credit policy shock. The solid
black lines in the figures show the response of the variables under optimal commitment
policy; the red dashed lines represent the outcomes under the optimal discretionary policy.
The technology shock is set as a negative one per cent innovation with a quarterly
autoregressive factor of 0.95. The impulse responses are depicted in Figure (4.1) with
twelve variables. Under optimal commitment policy, when the economy is hit by negative
technology shock, the most striking impact on variables is the 3 per cent drop of invest-
ment. The decline in investment leads to a slight reduction in asset price by 1 per cent
and net worth by 1.5 per cent. The decreased balance sheet leads to a growth of premium
by 0.02 per cent. Due to the increasing cost of capital, capital declines, then pushing
investment and asset prices further down. Since the central bank is committed to the op-
timal policy, the interest rate goes down to prevent an economic downturn. The inflation
rate is strictly negatively correlated with the nominal interest rate. Even though credit
intervention is also implemented, the changes in inflation, credit intervention, premium,
and optimal leverage are quite small.
4.4.2 Technology shock
Under the optimal discretionary policy, the responses are more volatile than those under
optimal commitment policy. The most substantial impacts are still depicted in investment,
output, and capital. The central bank makes decisions that are optimal in each period
without committing itself to any actions, implementing less change in interest rate but
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to a negative technology Shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a negative technology shock in the financial accelerator
model with credit interventions under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines)
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more credit intervention. With stronger credit intervention, the inflation bias also occurred
when inflation is more persistently above the zero levels steady-state.
4.4.3 Capital Quality Shock
The FACP Model (v = 10)
Figure (4.2) describes the impulse responses of capital quality shock under commitment
and discretion. The level of credit intervention is selected as v = 10. Under optimal
commitment policy, the central bank is committed to the interest rate instrument only.
This can be shown in Figure (4.2) that the nominal interest rate is around zero under the
discretion, and credit intervention is also around zero steady-states under commitment.
When the quality of capital declines by 5 per cent, the deterioration of intermediary capital
would disrupt lending and borrowing in the intermediary sector, then the net worth falls
by approximately 15 per cent. The reduced effective quality of capital in the production
function also leads to a decline in output by 1.6 per cent. After that, the consumption
by 4.4 per cent, investment by 3.7 per cent. With interest rate instruments, premium and
leverage also contracted significantly to a level around zero. The effect on the inflation
rate is also small and back to zero steady-states once the policy’s influence has vanished.
On the other hand, when the central bank discrete from the interest rate instrument and
implements the credit intervention, the responses are more volatile than those under com-
mitment. With the reduced 5 per cent capital quality, the net worth drops approximately
50 per cent; leverage increases around 37 per cent, making funding for firms much more
difficult than before. Therefore, investment also declines by around 18 per cent. Stronger
influences also occur for output, consumption, and capital. If the central bank implements
the moderate credit intervention (v = 10), this will generate an expansion of the central
bank balance sheet, increasing to around seven per cent of the value of the capital stock.
This result is the same as in the GK model.
Moreover, the central bank’s intermediation dampens the lift in the premium and optimal
leverage, inducing growth in investment, net worth, output, consumption, and capital. Be-
sides, the inflation rate under discretion has recovered, overshot from the zero steady-state
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to Capital Quality Shock (v = 10)
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a capital quality shock in the financial accelerator




and increased at a higher level by 0.1 per cent permanently; even it is a small amount.
This is the stabilisation bias due to the central bank not being able to commit and leads
to over-stabilised output at the cost of greater inflation variability.
The FACP Model (v = 100)
In terms of the GK model, the above results give a moderate credit intervention that
has occurred in practice. This part will access the results when the feedback parameter
is increased to 100, indicating an aggressive credit intervention. The aggressive policy
intervention produces a lower intensity of the response.
Under an optimal commitment policy, the central bank commits to the interest rate rule to
minimise the unconditional expectation of the welfare loss function. According to Figure
(4.3), the responses under commitment have similar movements compared to the commit-
ted moderate credit intervention. This is because they both commit to the interest rate
rule; the change in credit intervention intensity does not matter.
Moreover, under the discretionary case, the central bank implements an aggressive inter-
vention, requiring that lending grows to approximately 15 per cent of the capital stock.
This result is the same as in the GK model. The whole process has been moderated signif-
icantly by reducing the rise in the premium and the leverage. The premium drops approx-
imately 0.5 per cent, and the leverage decreases by approximately 7 per cent. Therefore,
this leads to a 10 per cent reduction in net worth. The drop in investment is moderated
from 18 per cent to 11 per cent. The other significant moderation occurs in asset price,
which decreases from approximate 7.9 per cent to 5.7 per cent. Nevertheless, output,
consumption, and capital all drop less and tend to recover at a faster pace.
The FACP Model (v = 0)
When the feedback parameter (v) is zero, the model becomes the FA model without credit
intervention. Under commitment, the main differences of responses appear in the leverage
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to Capital Quality Shock at Level
(v = 100)
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a capital quality shock in the financial accelerator




ratio and net worth. When the capital quality deteriorates, leverage ratio increases by 5
per cent, which is 1 per cent higher when v = 10 and 2 per cent higher when v = 100. Net
worth drops by 17 per cent, that is 2 per cent more than the other two scenarios. The
other variables show similar results. This implies that leverage and net worth are different
under capital quality shock, even though the credit intervention plays no role under the
commitment scenario.
In the discretionary case, the FA model without credit intervention illustrates many
volatile responses than the previous two cases. In the beginning, the leverage ratio in-
creases by 49 per cent. This is 16 per cent higher than the moderate credit intervention
case and 20 per cent higher than the aggressive credit intervention case. Therefore, the
net worth declines by 66 per cent, which is much higher than 50 per cent (v = 10) and
40 per cent (v = 100). Investment also drops by 27 per cent, much higher than before.
The contraction is even worse in output, consumption, and asset price. In contract to
the three levels, we can find that the credit intervention has more significant impacts on
macroeconomic variables to capital quality shock.
4.4.4 Net Worth Shock
Figure (4.5) response to the shock to the intermediary net worth under commitment and
discretion. It can be seen that the influences of net worth shock are trivial except for
optimal leverage. Under optimal commitment policy, a decline in the intermediary net
worth leads to the growth of leverage and premium, leading to higher funding costs for
firms. A 2 per cent increase in leverage ratio produces a drop in asset price, output,
and investment of 0.1 per cent, 0.4 per cent, and 0.9 per cent. When the central bank
is committed to interest rate, and credit intervention, leverage, and premium all move
downward, leading to a lift in asset price, investment and output. When the central bank
discrete from the interest rate instrument and implements only credit interventions, a 1
per cent drop in net worth produces a 1 per cent reduction in leverage and 0.03 per cent
fall in premium. With credit intervention, a 0.4 per cent increase in the value of capital
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to Capital Quality Shock at Level
(v = 0)
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a capital quality shock in the financial accelerator model
under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines), when there is no credit intervention (v=0).
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stock leads to a contraction in both interest rate spread and leverage. After that, the
eased cost for funding recovers the investment, asset price, and output.
4.4.5 Credit policy shock
Figure (4.6) plots the responses of credit policy shock under commitment and discretion.
The credit intervention concerns the situation that the central bank intervenes in the mar-
ket directly through injecting more credit during the financial crisis period. Under optimal
commitment policy, an approximately two per cent increase in credit policy intervention
would induce a 2 per cent growth in net worth through a 1.6 per cent drop in leverage and
a 0.6 per cent decline in premium. This, in turn, leads to an acceleration of investment by
0.6 per cent. Therefore, more investment implies higher output, consumption, and asset
price. Since the central bank is committed to the interest rate instrument, it observes
the credit policy shock by changing only slightly the nominal interest rate during the first
few periods. The inflation rate is negatively related to the interest rate and goes to zero
steady-state once the effect has vanished.
Under the optimal discretionary policy, the central bank discrete from interest rate
instrument by applying credit policy only. The subplots show that the overall responses
are more volatile than those under commitment. Without the influence of interest rate,
leverage is dragged down by 3.3 per cent. This, in turn, leads to an increase of net worth
by 4.6 per cent. Also, the lower cost of funding again drives investment higher by 1.3 per
cent, which is more than double it was under commitment. The growth of output, con-
sumption, and asset price comes after higher investment. However, the inflation bias still
occurs with discretion behaviour as it varies dramatically around a steady-state. Luckily,
the sacrifice of inflation rate variation is not insignificant intensity.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to Intermediary Net Worth Shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a net worth shock in the financial accelerator model
with credit intervention under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
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4.5 Financial Accelerator (FA) Model under Commitment
and Discretion
In this section, we apply the commitment and discretion scenario into the financial accel-
erator model, which is analysed in the GK model. Different from the previous part, there
is no credit intervention; thus, this study of the financial frictions model can be compared
to previous research. We then can identify the influences of credit intervention in the
unconventional monetary policy. Three shocks will be discussed in the following.
4.5.1 Technology Shock
Figure (4.7) illustrates the responses of technology shock to the financial frictions model
under optimal commitment and discretion. One per cent drop in technology shock would
generate a reduction in investment by 3.7 per cent under commitment. The contraction
of investment is a result of the rise in the premium, leverage ratio and a decline in the net
worth of intermediaries. The unanticipated fall in investment decreases output, capital,
and asset prices, which in turn generates a deterioration of banks’ balance sheets. This
increases the premium and leverage, diminishing borrowing capacity for firms, and further
reduces aggregate demand, which generates lower output, consumption, and investment.
The main responses of the technology shock under the optimal commitment policy is to
produce leverage, net worth, investment, and output. Since the central bank is committed
to the nominal interest rate instrument, it drops the nominal interest rate by approxi-
mately 1 per cent to observe the technology shock. This would reduce the leverage ratio
and premium, in turn, increasing the investment and output. The central bank lifts the
nominal interest rate after a short period once it observes the growth of the inflation rate.
When the central bank discrete from the nominal interest rate, the nominal interest
rate is approximately around the zero steady-state. The responses are more volatile under
the discretionary case. The leverage ratio increases approximately by 4 per cent, much
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higher than the 1.3 per cent under commitment. The investment also shrinks further to
4.98 per cent, which is a result of a 0.17 per cent increase in premium and a 5.5 per cent
reduction in net worth. The inflation bias occurs when the inflation rate overshoots the
zero steady-state and goes up to a higher level permanently.
4.5.2 Shock to Capital Quality
Figure (4.8) provides the plots of the responses for the capital quality shock under optimal
commitment and discretionary policy. The overall movements of those variables are similar
to the previous credit intervention model, except that the responses are slightly more
volatile. For the commitment scenario, the leverage increases by 5.26 per cent in the
financial accelerator model, while it grows 3.35 per cent in the credit intervention model.
The net worth falls by 16.55 per cent, relative to 15.28 per cent, respectively. The biggest
gap occurs in the premium, which goes up 0.2 per cent in this financial frictions model
and 0.037 per cent in the previous model. For the discretionary case, the leverage ratio
increases more than 13 per cent under the financial frictions model. The net worth drops
by more than 20 per cent compared to the credit intervention model. The other dramatic
difference is drawn in the investment, which decreases more than 10 per cent in the financial
frictions model. In addition, without credit intervention, the impacts on the contraction
under capital quality shock vanish much faster. For most variables, the influences of credit
intervention diminish around period 20 and return quickly to the steady-state.
4.5.3 Net Worth Shock
The responses of net worth shock with the financial accelerator model is plotted in Figure
(4.9). The movements of variables are similar as before, except that the model without
credit intervention shows more volatile movements. Under the optimal commitment pol-
icy, the leverage ratio increases by 5.25 per cent in the financial frictions model and 2.29
per cent in the credit intervention model. The most significant difference is seen in invest-
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Figure 4.6: Impulse Responses in the FACP Model to Credit Policy Shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a credit policy shock in the financial accelerator model
with credit intervention under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
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Figure 4.7: Impulse Responses in the FA Model to a negative technology shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a negative technology shock in the financial accelerator
model under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
ment, which drops 0.9 per cent in the credit intervention model and 2.3 per cent without
the credit intermediation. Other variables have a small impact on the net worth shock
in both models. Under the discretionary scenario, the gap between those two models is
smaller than it is in the commitment case.
4.5.4 Assessing the Results of the Financial Accelerator Model
Table 4.6: Results under optimal monetary policy with Financial Accelerator Model








1.1995 0.0244 296.0766 367.2076 19.3708 8.4339
NOTES: This table shows the optimal interest rate rule parameters (κpi and κy), the
value of the central bank loss under commitment (LC) and discretion (LD), the percent-




Figure 4.8: Impulse Responses in the FA Model to Capital Quality Shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a capital quality shock in the financial accelerator
model under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
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In this part, we will discuss the welfare gain from the financial accelerator model. Table
(4.6) provides the results of welfare gain under commitment and consumption equivalent.
The best parameters using the interest rule are 1.1995 for the inflation rate and 0.0244 for
the output gap. Same as before, the loss under commitment is still smaller than the loss
under discretion. In addition, the loss and welfare gain under commitment in the financial
accelerator model is smaller than it is in the previous model. However, the consumption
equivalent shows by 8.4339, which is more stable than the previous model by 12.4973.
Table 4.7: Results under optimal monetary policy with different diverted fraction of capital








0.15 293.9258 547.9779 46.3617 15.9390
0.2 294.4478 490.7053 39.9950 14.0092
0.25 294.9273 459.5828 35.8272 12.8318
0.3 295.379 440.8087 32.9916 12.0594
0.381 296.0766 422.9360 29.9949 11.2632
NOTES: This table shows the value of the central bank loss under commitment (LC) and
discretion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment (Ω) and the consumption equivalent
(ĈE), for different parameters financial intermediaries’ fraction of capital that can be diverted
(λ).
When the diverted fraction of capital varies in the financial accelerator model, the
results in Table (4.7) show a similar pattern with the FACP model. First, the loss under
commitment raises as the fraction of capital level increases from 0.15 to 0.381. At the same
time, the loss under discretion goes down as the fraction of capital lifts. Second, the gain
from commitment and consumption equivalent also follows the decreasing pattern. Third,
compared to the previous credit intervention model, the loss under commitment provides
similar figures. However, the loss under discretion is much bigger in the credit intervention
model. The gain from commitment varies from 46.3617 to 29.9949, which is smaller than
the model before (65.4817 to 34.6098). The consumption equivalent illustrates a more
stable result than before varying 15.9390 to 11.2632 compared to 23.6112 to 12.5186.
Therefore, there is one trade-off between commitment and stabilisation of consumption
when implementing the credit intervention policy.
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Table 4.8: Results under optimal monetary policy with different survival rate of bankers








0.7 312.3917 631.9192 50.5646 17.8753
0.8 308.1775 699.4026 55.9370 19.7794
0.85 305.8165 442.2415 30.8485 11.6801
0.9 303.0392 422.9360 28.3487 10.9497
0.9715 296.0766 367.2076 19.3708 8.4339
NOTES: This table shows the value of the central bank loss under commitment (LC)
and discretion (LD), the percentage gain from commitment (Ω) and the consumption
equivalent (ĈE), for different parameters with the central bank intervention intensities
(θ).
Table (4.8) gives the results under different levels of survival rate for bankers in the
financial frictions model. For the loss under commitment, the result is more or less similar
as before. However, the loss under discretion shows dramatic differences. In the financial
accelerator model, the highest loss is 699.4026 when θ = 0.8 and lowest loss is 367.2076
when θ = 0.9715. In the previous model, the highest loss generated when θ = 0.9 and
lowest loss produces when θ = 0.8. The loss without credit intervention is overall larger.
Moreover, there is also a trade-off between the gain of commitment and consumption
equivalent in these two models. In the financial frictions model, the gain varies from
19.3708 to 55.9370, but the previous model varies from 8.7546 to 53.1102. The consump-
tion equivalent, on the other hands, shows less stable results that vary from 8.4339 to
19.7794 in the financial accelerator model and 5.4171 to 18.5273 in the credit intervention
model.
4.5.5 Results Analysis for the FACP and FA Model
In terms of the previous comparisons and impulse responses, we can summarise some fun-
damental points in the FACP and FA Model under commitment and discretion. First,
the central bank benefits welfare gains around 24 per cent by committing to the opti-
mal interest rate policy rule during the financial crisis period. Second, the variations of
credit intervention intensities (v) and the divertable fraction of capital stock (λ) in un-
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Figure 4.9: Impulse Responses in the FA Model to Net Worth shock
Note: This figure shows the impulse responses to a net worth shock in the financial accelerator model
under commitment (solid lines) and discretion (dashed lines).
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conventional monetary policy matters for welfare-based gains and consumption volatility.
Higher credit interventions could lead to more stable consumption during the financial
crisis period. However, the central bank is committed to keeping the intervention level at
v=10 to achieve highest welfare gains. Besides, a higher leverage ratio leads to more con-
sumption volatilities and lower welfare gains. The central bank has an incentive to keep
a high divertable fraction of capital value, meaning a low leverage ratio, to achieve the
most stable consumption. Third, we quantitatively confirm that the financial accelerator
model with credit interventions have crucial effects on the economy to the capital quality
shock. It is fundamental for central banks to commit to optimal policy rules to achieve
stable consumption and higher welfare.
4.6 Conclusion
There has been a large amount of literature to study the unconventional monetary policy,
either with DSGE models or with an interest rate lower bound. The common research
has confirmed the importance of central banks to commit to a low-interest rate with other
credit interventions. In this paper, we have quantified the welfare gain from the commit-
ment to the unconventional monetary policy model. We implemented the simple Taylor
rule to minimise the non-linear loss function. When central banks commit to the optimal
interest rate instrument, credit intervention plays a fundamental rule in the mechanism. In
a discretionary regime, central banks optimise in every period, taking as given the current
state of the economy and private sector expectations. Since the public recognises that
central banks would optimise each period, any promise that central banks make about
future policy would not be credible.
For the financial accelerator model with credit policy, the capital quality shock shows
more fundamental impacts for the whole transmission mechanism than the other shocks.
The most affected variables are leverage ratio, net worth, investment, and asset price.
Moreover, the intensity of the credit policy feedback parameter affects investment through
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leverage ratio, premium, and net worth. The highest gain from commitment was obtained
when credit intervention is small. However, to have the most stable consumption equiv-
alent requires a higher intensity of credit intervention around 50. If central banks can
commit to a low level of intervention, then they can obtain the highest welfare gains.
However, central banks might also deviate to a higher level of interventions to achieve
more stable consumption. The different levels of a diverted fraction of capital show a
decreasing pattern in the gain from commitment as the fraction increases from 0.15 to
0.38. In contrast, consumption equivalent provides the most stable consumption with the
highest fraction of divertable capital value or low leverage ratio. For the survival rate of
intermediaries, the highest gain from commitment was 0.9, but the most stable consump-
tion equivalent was 0.85. From the results, we can see that central banks would always
have the incentive to deviate from the single interest rate instrument to credit interven-
tion, especially for the financial crisis period with a deterioration of balance sheet due to
capital quality shock.
For the financial accelerator model, capital quality shock still plays a crucial role in the
economy as it influences financial frictions, such as interest rate spread, leverage ratio, and
net worth. Under a discretionary regime, the shocks produce fewer effects on investment.
The diverted fraction of capital and survival rate of intermediaries show similar patterns
in the gain from commitment and consumption is equivalent to the results with credit
intervention policy. The main purpose of this chapter is to quantify the welfare gain under
commitment for the unconventional monetary policy. Compared to the welfare gains of
McAdam et al. (2007) to ours, the outcome shows that the welfare gains from commitment
are significantly larger than McAdam et al. (2007)’s. The gains of consumption equivalent
under commitment are approximately 10% higher in financial accelerator model with credit
intervention than McAdam et al. (2007)’s model without financial frictions. The gains
of consumption equivalent under commitment are also approximately 8% higher in our
financial accelerator model without credit intervention than McAdam et al. (2007)’s model.
Therefore, given the large gains from the model with financial frictions under commitment,
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4.7 The Unconventional Monetary Policy Model
ρ = (Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ (4.12)
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Int = It − δξtKt−1 (4.30)
Kt = ξtKt−1 + Int (4.31)
Gt = Gssgt (4.32)
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Xt = 1/Pmt (4.36)
Ft = YtPmt + βγΛt+ 1) ∗ πεt+1 ∗ (πt)( − εγP )Ft+1) (4.37)
Zt = Yt + βγΛt+1)πt+1)
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ψt = κ(Rkt+1 −Rt −RkmRss) + εψ (4.43)
at = ρaat−1 − ea (4.44)
ξt = ρξξt−1 − eξ (4.45)
gt = ρggt−1 − eg (4.46)
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εψt = ρεψεψt−1 + eψ (4.47)
Keff,t = ξtKt−1 (4.48)

























This thesis attempts to answer three questions:
(1) What is the optimal choice for the central bank in alternative monetary policy
instruments: interest rate pegging, or constant money supply?
(2) What happens if the macroprudential policy is model misspecified?
(3) What are the gains from the commitment under the optimal unconventional
monetary policy?
To answer the above questions, we apply various DSGE models under different cir-
cumstances. In the first essay, the main contribution of our research is to apply an
estimated Smets and Wouters (2003) model into Collard and Dellas (2005) to exam-
ine Poole’s analysis. Through changing the utility function to keep the real balance,
the welfare function is derived from comparing those alternative policy instruments.
We utilize the quarterly data of the Euro area for the period between Q2 and Q3 in
2007; the results are appealing under different shocks.
The result shows that under a technology shock, the constant money supply instru-
ment is preferable as stability in output and consumption as well as in higher welfare.
Second, the preference shock prefers a monetary targeting procedure as it stabilizes
output and generates higher consumption. Third, interest rate targeting fares better
when intertemporal substitution is low under fiscal shock and an equity premium
shock. Besides, interest rate targeting is also favoured under wage mark-up shock
regarding the degree of risk aversion, and when intertemporal substitution is high
under price mark-up shock. Fourth, under-investment shock, monetary targeting
fares better when risk aversion is high and is ambiguous when risk aversion is low.
Therefore, the ranking differs under various shocks and intertemporal substitution
matters under some shocks.
Further, the second essay is aimed to apply Dennis et al. (2009) robust control
method into macroprudential policy. Since the prolonged adverse financial crisis
effects, central banks have carried out diverse macroprudential policies to buffer fi-
nancial risks in the future. However, policymakers do not know if their models with
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macroprudential is a true DGP or not. The robust control method by Dennis et al.
(2009) can simplify the state-space form problem from the minimax approach and
prior distribution issues in the Bayesian method. By applying the robust control
method in the KRS model with the housing market boom, we find that macropru-
dential policy is a strong instrument to offset financial shocks. The robust macro-
prudential policymakers response more aggressive in the worst-case scenario than it
in the rational expectations and the approximating case.
Finally, the third essay quantifies the welfare differences between commitment and
discretion for the optimal unconventional monetary policy. We implement the sim-
ple Taylor rule to minimize the non-linear loss function. In the discretionary regime,
central banks optimize its policy strategy in every period, taking as given the current
state of the economy and private sector expectations. Since the public recognizes
that central banks would optimize each period, any promises that central banks
make about future policy would not be credible. The outcomes show that capital
quality shock plays a more important role than other shocks for the financial ac-
celerator model with credit intervention. Further, the intensity of the credit policy
feedback parameter influences investment through leverage ratio, premium, and net
worth. The highest gain from commitment is obtained when credit intervention is
small. However, to have the most stable consumption equivalent requires a higher
intensity of credit intervention around 50.
Even though there are some crucial findings that have carried out in the thesis, there
are still some limitations. To begin with, money demand shock is not included in
the first essay. This could be one important factor when the real money balance is
kept in the DSGE model. Furthermore, the KRS model applied in the second essay
is calibrated. Those parameters’ value might be more practical through further es-
timation. Finally, the unconventional model in the third essay is also not estimated
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Gaĺı, J. (2007). Monetary policy, inflation, and the business cycle chapter 6 a model
with sticky wages and prices.
Galı, J., Gertler, M., and Lopez-Salido, J. D. (2001). European inflation dynamics.
European Economic Review, 45(7):1237–1270.
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